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REMAKING LAW:  
MOVING BEYOND ENLIGHTENMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
JOHN A. POWELL* AND STEPHEN M. MENENDIAN** 
INTRODUCTION 
“Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.  The 
role of an umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure everybody plays by 
the rules, but it is a limited role.  Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the 
umpire.” 
- John Roberts (2005)1 
Then-judge John Roberts invoked this analogy in his prepared opening 
statement during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  As an expression of “judicial restraint,”2 the umpire analogy was 
likely calculated to assuage or deflect Senatorial concern that Roberts, if 
confirmed, might eventually vote to overturn Roe v. Wade.3  For more than a 
generation, the issue of abortion, and the scope and validity of Roe v. Wade as 
precedent, dominated Supreme Court confirmation hearings and the 
surrounding public debates over potential nominees.4 
Commentators on the political Left have since derided Roberts’ umpire 
analogy, particularly in light of what they view as a conservative-activist 
 
* john a. powell is the Williams Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Moritz College of Law, 
Ohio State University and Executive Director, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and 
Ethnicity, Ohio State University.  The author does not capitalize his name.  Stephen Menendian is 
an attorney and senior legal research associate at the Kirwan Institute. 
** The authors would like to thank the law school and the Saint Louis University Law Journal 
and Professor Joel Goldstein.  The authors would also like to thank Caitlin Watt, a Research 
Associate at the Kirwan Institute, and Brookes Hammock, a third-year law student at the Moritz 
College of Law, the Ohio State University, for their tremendous and tireless research assistance. 
 1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of John G., Roberts, Jr., nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) [hereinafter 
Roberts Hearing]. 
 2. Contraposed to traditional conservative hostility to ‘judicial activism.’  See JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73 (1980). 
 3. Roberts Hearing, supra note 1.  The remainder of his statement, laced with words like 
“modesty” and “humility,” supports this insight.  See id. 
 4. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 281 (2007) (noting that Roe v. Wade dominated public 
discourse). 
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voting record on the Court.5  Other commentators, including those on the 
political Right, take issue with the apparent simplicity of the umpire metaphor, 
which suggests constitutional adjudication is as mechanical as calculating the 
“circumference of a circle.”6  These criticisms reached a crescendo during the 
confirmation hearings of then-judge Sonia Sotomayor.  Senators’ statements 
and oral testimony referenced the phrase “balls and strikes” eleven times and 
the term “umpire” or “umpires” sixteen times.7  Despite the volume of ridicule, 
criticism of the umpire analogy has generally focused on whether the Chief 
Justice Roberts’ record is consistent with the judicial philosophy embodied in 
the umpire analogy or with the methodological simplicity of “umpiring” as a 
metaphor for Supreme Court adjudication.8 
Upon closer inspection, the umpire analogy is more than a symbol of 
judicial restraint or a metaphor for judicial method.  The analogy contains a 
constellation of generally unquestioned assumptions and tacit beliefs about the 
role of the judge and the nature of law that flow from the Enlightenment period 
into contemporary jurisprudence.  The analogy reflects particular ways of 
knowing and being, epistemological and ontological commitments that are 
deeply embedded in our law and our culture.  In Part I, we will unpack these 
assumptions and, in the process, specify the grammar of the Enlightenment 
Project. 
The religious and cultural crisis in Western Europe during the early 
seventeenth century triggered an epistemological crisis.  Methodology became 
 
 5. For example, Marjorie Cohn, President of the National Lawyers Guild, told us, “Since he 
was confirmed to the Court, Roberts has behaved more like a radical right fielder than an umpire.  
He routinely favors corporations over individuals, and prosecutors over criminal defendants.  
Roberts is doing his best—quite effectively—to shape the Court into a reliable tool to further the 
right-wing agenda.”  William Fisher, Sotomayor: The Umpire Strikes Out!, (Aug. 10, 2009), 
http://pubrecord.org/law/3438/sotomayor-umpire-strike-out/; see also Kristina Moore, Box Score: 
Calling “Balls and Strikes” at Sotomayor’s Confirmation Hearing (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/box-score-calling-balls-and-strikes-at-sotomayors-confirmation-
hearing/. 
 6. Fisher, supra note 5 (“[A] Justice who believes that the makers intended the 
constitutional amendment process to be employed to overcome oversights or unexpected changes 
in the political landscape as opposed to enlightened and independent judges will naturally be 
loath to read anything more into the Constitution’s text than the bare minimum.”).  To the extent 
that Roberts’s analogy suggests that “when objectively applied by a neutral judge,” the law “gives 
correct answers in specific cases” has been described as so farfetched that it constitutes a straw 
man of the critical legal studies universe and, furthermore, that “[f]ew American lawyers today” 
would subscribe to such a view of law.  Joan Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of 
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 486 (1987). 
 7. See Moore, supra note 5. 
 8. For one example of critique in this mode, see Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On 
Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 
B.U. L. Rev 1069 (2006). 
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an issue of great importance.  Two schools of thought emerged with competing 
formulas for the “proper” method of knowing: Baconian experimentalism and 
Cartesian rationalism.  Isaac Newton synthesized both the rationalist and 
experimentalist traditions into a conception of science that is now considered 
by most as orthodoxy. 
Enlightenment thinkers sought to develop systemic principles for 
understanding the social and moral realm using an epistemology of the new 
science.  Just as Newton formulated fundamental laws of physics, 
Enlightenment thinkers sought to extend that paradigm—one of universal laws 
derived from proper method—into the social sciences.  Although the efforts to 
borrow from the natural sciences failed to produce the kind of mathematical 
rigor embodied in Newton’s laws of motion, the cultural influence of this new 
paradigm was profound.  We will describe the assumptions and practices 
within this worldview in Part I. 
In Part II we will show how these assumptions and practices have been an 
enduring force in shaping Anglo-American law and American constitutional 
law.  Modern jurisprudence sprang from an attempt to make law more 
scientific.  Enlightenment thinkers such as Grotius and Leibniz developed the 
doctrine of Natural Law in an attempt to discover the universal principles of 
morality that would inform law.  The American declarations were drafted 
under the prevailing influence of Natural Law theorists.  At the time of the 
colonial rebellion in North America, the Enlightenment was at the height of its 
influence.  Leading Enlightenment thinkers hoped that the American 
Revolution might put into practice the ideas that had evolved and emerged 
over the previous century in Europe.  Not only the founding documents but 
also the common law was caught in the Enlightenment’s sweep.  The legacy of 
Newtonian science, and the Enlightenment philosophy it bore, pervades 
American jurisprudence. 
In Part III we will present modern developments in the physical and mind 
sciences that challenge the assumptions of the Enlightenment Project.  Niels 
Bohr’s philosophy physics not only calls into question Newtonian physics, but 
also Cartesian epistemology and a host of Enlightenment notions.  There is a 
deep indeterminacy that is not just present in postmodernism or hermeneutics, 
but also in what we think of as physical reality.  The development of systems 
thinking and complexity theory is a response to the linear and reductionist 
science of the eighteenth century.  The principles of this new science suggest 
divergent models of causality and project a different view of our relationship to 
the world.  The new science of the mind provides insight into the ways in 
which the mind interacts with the world, even below conscious awareness. 
In Part IV we will explore the implications of these developments for our 
jurisprudence.  We will confront the ramifications of the Enlightenment 
paradigm in our law, applying the insights derived from systems science, mind 
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sciences, and quantum physics.  We contest the objective, neutral judicial actor 
and explore the relationship between adjudication and legal meaning. 
In Part VI, we will sketch out ways of formulating and practicing law that 
will take account of these revised ways of knowing and being.  We lift up 
models of law that account for post-Newtonian insights, including prophylactic 
regimes and anti-reductionist approaches in law. 
The Enlightenment is the language and grammar of modernity, not just 
law.9  Consequently, although our focus will be law, the challenge to the 
Enlightenment Project has very broad implications which we can only begin to 
explore.10  Our efforts here are not entirely novel.  For several decades, 
anomalies in the Enlightenment paradigm have been exposed with increasing 
frequency.  The challenge to the separate self and objective knowledge has 
been made from many quarters, including critical race theory,11 feminist 
studies,12 and post modernism.13  Robin West observed that if to be human is 
to be separate, rational, and objective, then “women are not human beings.”14  
Such a self is not only male, but also white.  This aspirational, disembodied 
self within the Enlightenment Project, while a fiction for all, exists as an 
assault on particular populations.15 
What makes our effort different?  While building on the work of others, we 
take a more deliberate look at the Enlightenment and science.  We do so, not 
because we believe science is “objective” in some narrow sense, but because it 
has become our public language and the basis for legitimating claims in the 
world.  While this is obviously true in science itself, we believe it is also true 
in the social sciences and law.  Much of the reliance on the methodology of 
science is rooted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and has not been 
 
 9. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE END OF WHAT MODERNITY? 129 (1995); 
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION 18 (2004). 
 10. Our aim here is not to develop a moral critique of the Enlightenment; rather, we 
elaborate a “grammar” of the period in order to demonstrate that its concepts have been 
discredited by contemporary developments in the social and natural sciences and, therefore, 
should be revised accordingly.  For one such critique of the Enlightenment, see MAX 
HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 3–42 (1972) 
(identifying a key Enlightenment impulse as the tendency for humans to have a purely 
instrumental relationship with nature that tends toward domination). 
 11. See generally john a. powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between Modernity and 
Postmodernity, 81 MINN L. REV. 1481 (1996) [hereinafter powell, The Multiple Self]. 
 12. See GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: “MALE” AND “FEMALE” IN WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY 103 (1984); KAREN BARAD, MEETING THE UNIVERSE HALFWAY 87 (2007); 
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW (1990) (providing a feminist critique of objective knowledge). 
 13. See Stephen M. Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern 
Legal Scholarship, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2367 (2001). 
 14. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988). 
 15. DAVID T. GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE 80 (2002). 
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informed as much by more recent scientific insight.  At a minimum, our law 
must be informed by developments in the last 100 years.16 
Some jurists appear to believe that they can avoid reliance on science or its 
methods altogether, and advance a deontological claim.17  Instead, they are 
unreflectively mimicking the transcendental rationalism of Descartes and Kant.  
However, our position is not that jurists or anyone else should rely on science, 
even more recent science, but that we need a greater awareness of what we are, 
in fact, doing.18  Widespread and generally unquestioned assumptions 
regarding causality, objectivity, the nature of the self and knowledge each have 
deep roots in both the Enlightenment Project and the science and philosophy of 
that time.  Others have drawn upon the insights of early twentieth-century 
developments of special relativity and quantum physics,19 the development in 
the mind sciences in the last two decades,20 and the implications of systems 
dynamics and complexity theory.21  We synthesize these often disparate 
efforts.  Together, these insights constitute a sustained paradigm assault on the 
Enlightenment Project. 
I.  THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 
Now the serpent was more crafty than any other wild animal that the LORD 
God had made.  He said to the woman, “Did God say, ‘You shall not eat from 
any tree of the garden’?” [ . . . ]  “For God knows that when you eat of it your 
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”  So 
when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight 
to the eyes, and that the tree was something to be desired to make one wise, 
she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave to her husband with her, who 
 
 16. Id. (noting that feminists, CRT, and others are asserting that the Enlightenment Project 
was a gendered and racialist project).  While we agree, we hope to be more granular in our 
examination and suggest how new science can help as we develop a new worldview. 
 17. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 109 (1991) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I believe 
that it is unwise, given our present understanding of the human mind, to suggest that a 
determination that a person has ‘regained sanity’ is precise.  ‘Psychiatry is not . . . an exact 
science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness.’” 
(quoting Ake v.Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 81 (1985)). 
 18. Consider, for example, the procedures for a trial or judgment during the time of magic or 
religious dominance of thought and knowledge.  The way of adjudicating or knowing necessarily 
drew on magical or religious ways of knowing.  Yet the current Court is no freer from drawing on 
some situated body of knowledge, however different in substance it may be than the age of magic 
or religious dominance.  The problem is that many of the justices erroneously assume they have 
access to a God’s eye view that is not situated but timeless and context free. 
 19. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers 
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. (1989). 
 20. GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND 8 (2008); DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL 
BRAIN at ix (2007). 
 21. J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1040 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1035 
was with her, and he ate.  Then the eyes of both were opened, and they 
knew . . . . 
- Genesis 3:1-722 
For much of European civilization from antiquity until the seventeenth 
century, knowledge was ultimately a product of divine revelation.  The story of 
the Garden of Eden in the Judeo–Christian Bible is illustrative.23  Consumption 
of the forbidden fruit would make Adam and Even “like God” in the sense of 
knowing what God knows.  The Quran contains a similar passage.24  This story 
not only illustrates the idea that knowledge is divine, but that such knowledge 
is transmitted through sacred texts.  Consequently, sacred texts were 
considered divine authority, and claims to truth or knowledge inconsistent with 
sacred texts were dismissed or suppressed. 
During that time, Roman Catholic papal authority had united Western 
Europe under a single Christian conception of religio–political authority and 
transcendental truth.25  The Protestant Reformation disrupted that order, 
generating cleavages between different versions of Christianity and between 
religious and secular political authority.26  The consequence was a full-scale 
political, religious, and cultural crisis that culminated in the Thirty-Years War 
(1618–48).  This devastating conflict reordered the European continent under 
the authority of nation–states rather than religions.27 
With the traditional institutional controls of the Church weakened, 
competing answers to profound questions about truth and knowledge were 
proffered and debated.28  Both Catholics and Protestants believed that 
knowledge and truth were “fixed and revealed to man from supernatural 
sources.”29  However, the Protestant Reformation stressed direct engagement 
with the Bible,30 unmediated by clerics or institutionalized authority.31  The 
 
 22. Genesis 3:1–7 (King James). 
 23. God forbid Adam and Eve from eating the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge.  Id. at 3.  
The serpent told Eve that if she did, she would “be like God, knowing good and evil.”  Id. at 3:5.  
Hoping to acquire wisdom, Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit.  Id. 3:6.  “Then the eyes of 
both were opened, and they knew . . . .”  Id. 3:7. (emphasis added). 
 24. Surah 2:35–39. 
 25. See STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 124 (1996). 
 26. See ROY PORTER, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 15 (1st ed. 1990). 
 27. See, e.g., C. V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 124, 126 (1938). 
 28. See id. at 124; PORTER, supra note 26, at 15. 
 29. FREEMAN R. BUTTS, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EDUCATION 217 (1955). 
 30. For Protestants, the Bible was the ultimate basis of religious and moral authority.  
Protestants emphasized the need for each person to establish the grounds of his or her belief by 
reading the Bible directly.  Some Protestant sects would allow individuals to interpret the Bible.  
Id. at 214–17. 
 31. See MARTIN LUTHER, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the 
Reform of the Christian Estate, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER 253, 256 (Theodore 
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individual acquisition of religious truth posed questions of interpretation that 
had once been resolved by clerical authority.  Leading thinkers in the Counter-
Reformation argued that Protestant theology was unable to reconcile 
alternative conceptions of religious truth.32  Against this backdrop, skepticism 
flourished.33  Critics worried that knowledge that is purely personal and not 
subject to verification is hardly knowledge at all.  Method—the means by 
which knowledge is secured—acquired great significance for the first time in 
many centuries.34  This epistemological crisis made possible and served as the 
impetus for both the Scientific Revolution35 and the Enlightenment.36 
Two schools of thought emerged in opposition to skepticism.  Together, 
they constitute the twin pillars of the still-popular conception of the scientific 
method.  The first is empiricism (or experimentalism): the view that “proper 
knowledge is and ought to be derived from direct sense experience.”37  The 
modern era father of this approach, Francis Bacon, believed that universal 
principles could be uncovered through experimental observation.38  While not 
a scientist himself (Bacon was a lawyer), Bacon was one of the leading 
proponents of science during the Reformation.39  Bacon, and others 
empiricists, such as Galileo and Boyle, believed that the book of nature was 
 
G. Tappert ed., Fortress Press 2007) (1520) (questioning various forms of Papal authority, 
including the sole authority of the Pope to interpret scripture). 
 32. See JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE 2 (2006). 
 33. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 5 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.A. Nidditch ed., 3rd ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1777); see generally ROBERT J. FOGELIN, HUME’S SKEPTICAL CRISIS: 
A TEXTUAL STUDY 11–20 (2009). 
 34. See SHAPIN, supra note 25 at 124–25.  This is also consistent with the Kuhnian sense in 
which a paradigm breakdown results in many competing schools of thought.  See THOMAS S. 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 12 (3d ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1996) 
(1962). 
 35. This term, attributed to Alexandre Koyré in 1939, is contested, although widely used.  
See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 2.  While there were undoubtedly profound conceptual shifts, some 
question whether it is appropriate to refer to a ‘revolution,’ or a singular period of time as 
particularly pivotal.  See id. at 65–69. 
 36. Id. at 69. 
 37. Id. 
 38. FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON at XX (Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne eds., 
2000) (1620) (“For in the first place, the information of the senses themselves is defective and 
deceiving; observation is lazy, uneven and casual; teaching is empty and based on hearsay; 
practice is slavishly bent on results; experimental initiative is blind, unintelligent, hasty and 
erratic; and natural history is shallow and superficial.”); see also BUTTS, supra note 29, at 219 
(noting Bacon published Novum Organum, or “New Organon,” as a new method to replace the 
traditional “organon,” Aristotle’s body of logical writings.). 
 39. BUTTS, supra note 29, at 218.  Part of Bacon’s influence lay in his eloquent and 
persuasive writing style and his political influence as Lord Chancellor and Attorney General of 
England.  Id. 
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laid open for them to read, if only they employed the proper method to 
decipher its text. 
To guard against the dangers of undisciplined empiricism, Bacon stressed 
the need for the careful accumulation of observational and experimental facts 
in drawing causal inferences and general principles.40  He proposed a 
systematic methodology of experimentation and hoped that theories would be 
tested against facts.  This methodology was inductive, but empirically 
grounded. 
The second school of thought, rationalism, is the view that reason alone 
was the source of universal and certain knowledge.41  Rationalism is associated 
with philosophers like Spinoza and Leibnitz, but is epitomized by Rene 
Descartes.  Like the skeptics, Descartes distrusted observation.  Having studied 
optical perspective, Descartes understood that the senses were apt to deceive,42 
that “[s]ense perceptions [were] sense deceptions.”43  Nonetheless, Descartes 
fiercely opposed skepticism.  He was committed wholeheartedly to the project 
of acquiring reliable knowledge of the world through reason, particularly 
mathematical reasoning.44 
In his writings, Descartes conveyed a deep sense of foreboding, that unless 
he could know something with absolute certainty, his world would fall into 
chaos.  The fear of being unable to tether existence to a foundation, to find the 
Archimedean point, is known as the “Cartesian Anxiety.”45  Descartes resolved 
this anxiety by discovering something that he could not doubt, and would 
therefore know with certainty.46 
 
 40. SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 92. 
 41. BUTTS, supra note 29, at 221.  Rationalists believed that only human reason could attain 
the “real knowledge” that lies beyond everyday experience.  Id. 
 42. Id.  Chief Justice Roberts claim that he “calls balls and strikes” as he sees it would not be 
a cause for comfort, but without the proper foundation, a cause for concern.  See id. 
 43. See MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS AND THE SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE 21 (1986). 
 44. See id. at 7; see also JERROLD SEIGEL, THE IDEA OF THE SELF 63–64 (2005).  Descartes 
was first and foremost a mathematician.  Prefiguring Newton, Descartes believes that all “natural 
phenomena” could be described using mathematics of algebra and geometry, since all matter was 
form in motion.  Id. at 64.  Newton’s Principia was an attempt to express these patterns and 
relationships in the form of mathematical equations.  See generally Isaac Newton, The Principia: 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (I. Bernard Cohen & Anne Whitman trans., 1999) 
(1726).  The difference was that Descartes did not have access to calculus, a tool that Newton 
had.  WILLIAM DUNHAM, THE CALCULUS GALLERY: MASTERPIECES FROM NEWTON TO 
LEBESGUE 5 (2008) (“Isaac Newton is revered as the creator of calculus, . . . .  [H]e absorbed the 
work of such predecessors as René Descartes . . . .”).  Descartes believed that mathematical 
reasoning could produce certain knowledge.  He hoped that all sciences could achieve the degree 
of certitude.  HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 6. 
 45. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, 
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 16–20 (1983). 
 46. Note that Descartes’ proposition was not just about how one can know, it was instead 
about who one is.  It is both an epistemological claim and an ontological claim.  Id. 
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Descartes’ solution began with the claim that he could not doubt the fact 
that he thinks (because each doubt was also a thought).  From there he 
formulated the famous cogito, dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum: “I doubt, 
therefore I think, therefore I am.”47  Descartes staked his project of reliable 
knowledge to his certainty of his own conscious self-existence.48  His self-
existence as a thinking being became the basis of knowledge and reason.  
“[C]lear and distinct ideas, purified by the filter by our intellect” was 
knowledge that could be trusted.49  For Descartes, mathematics was an 
enterprise that produced such knowledge. 
The naturalistic philosophers of the Scientific Revolution widely agreed 
that mathematics was the most certain form of knowledge.50  They disagreed 
on the scope of its application.  As a young man Descartes became convinced 
that mathematics provided the basis for a science built on certainty, a 
“universal mathematics.”51  If matter was simply form in motion, then the 
principles of algebra and geometry could describe it.  In contrast to Baconian 
experimentalism, Cartesian rationalism is primarily deductive.52  In search of 
certain knowledge, only conclusions drawn from unquestionable premises 
provide confidence in their reliability.  Descartes believed that mathematics 
provided the most reliable (or “clear and distinct”) ideas from which reasoned 
inferences about the world might be drawn.53  Accordingly, Descartes 
championed a mathematical view of the universe.54  Descartes, like Hobbes 
and Gassendi, believed that the entire physical universe was a great machine—
the clockwork universe—operating according to laws that may be discovered 
by human reason, particularly through mathematical reasoning.55  This 
mechanical worldview, and the mathematics supporting it, applied to all 
physical bodies, including human beings, which might be treated as “an 
 
 47. René Descartes, First Set of Objections, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF 
DESCARTES: VOLUME II 68 (John Cottingham, William Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch trans., 
Cambridge 1984) (1641). 
 48. In so doing, rationality claimed freedom from authority, either of traditional or political 
or military authority.  This was a completely new ground of knowledge, and it is marked by 
Hegel as the beginning of modern philosophy.  See SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 55.  Seigel describes 
the cogito as the “sheet anchor” for Descartes’ project.  Id. at 56. 
 49. Id. at 58. 
 50. See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 58. 
 51. SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 63–65. 
 52. Id. at 57. 
 53. Id. at 65. 
 54. See HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 6.  Kepler and Galileo believed that nature was 
mathematical in structure—that God was a mathematician.  See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 58, 60. 
 55. KLINE, supra note 43, at 7; see also BUTTS, supra note 29, at 220. 
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earthen machine.”56  Importantly, however, Descartes believed that the mind 
was independent of matter and free from these mechanical laws.57 
The natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution set themselves 
against the ancients and their authority.  They believed that one should consult 
the authority of “individual reason” and the evidence of “natural reality.”58  
They rejected the use of a few particulars to arrive hastily at general principles.  
This method began to chip away at the edifice of the Aristotelian cosmos.  The 
discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo displaced the geocentric 
Ptolemaic model of the universe.  In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus called into 
question the idea that the Earth formed the immobile center of the universe.59  
Galileo’s telescopic observations, including the identification of sunspots and 
the moons orbiting Jupiter, in conjunction with Kepler’s description of 
planetary motion, lent credibility to the Copernican model while improving 
upon it.60 
Isaac Newton synthesized both the rationalist and experimentalist 
traditions into a conception of science that is now considered by most as 
orthodoxy.61  Although the experimentalists were fundamentally cautious, 
Newton fused Baconion empiricism with a newfound universal, mathematical 
certainty.  The mechanical and mathematical view of nature fully arrived with 
Isaac Newton’s Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.62  
In its wake, the Aristotelian cosmos crumbled, and a new worldview 
emerged.63 The product is the methodological cornerstone of the 
Enlightenment. 
Today’s social sciences—sociology, economics, political science, 
psychology, anthropology—are the fruit of the Enlightenment.64  Just as 
 
 56. SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 47. 
 57. BUTTS, supra note 29, at 220 (“Mind is a free agent, but matter is a machine.”). 
 58. SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 68. 
 59. See NICHOLAUS COPERNICUS, ON THE REVOLUTIONS OF THE HEAVENLY SPHERES 
(Charles Glenn Wallace trans., Running Press 2004) (1543). 
 60. See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 15, 26, 59. 
 61. See Isaac Newton, Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy, in SIR ISAAC NEWTON’S 
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND HIS SYSTEM OF THE WORLD 398–
400 (Andrew Mott trans., 2003) (1686); BERNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 21. 
 62. Isaac Newton, Principia, in SIR ISAAC NEWTON’S MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND HIS SYSTEM OF THE WORLD, supra note 61, at 1–28. 
 63. It was not just the model of the solar system that had been replaced, in fact, the edifice of 
Greek thought, including causality, the four elements, Aristotelian forms, and their view of nature 
were also called into question.  See SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 54–55. 
 64. See PORTER, supra note 26, at 21; see also I. BERNARD COHEN, INTERACTIONS: SOME 
CONTACTS BETWEEN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 19–21 (1994).  
Cohen, former President of the History of Science Society, suggests it was believed that social 
science could operate in ways comparable to the newly hegemonic natural sciences, and he 
explores the ways in which that borrowing occurred.  Id. 
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Newton formulated fundamental laws of physics, drawing upon the work of 
Kepler and Galileo, Enlightenment thinkers sought to extend that paradigm—
one of universal laws—into the social sciences.  Confident that knowledge 
could improve society, these thinkers carried this formula to all of the arts and 
sciences.65  This was the thrust of the Enlightenment: to craft a “science of 
man.”66  David Hume, for example, was regarded as the “Newton of the moral 
sciences.”67  Inspired by Newtonian ideas, John Locke sought to elaborate the 
laws of human nature in a scientific manner.68  Hobbes’ Leviathan modeled a 
science of society (politics) on the new science of motion, mechanics, and new 
physiology.69  Enlightenment thinkers sought to develop systemic principles 
for understanding the world using an epistemology of the new science.70  
Although efforts to borrow from the natural sciences failed to produce the kind 
of mathematical laws that Newton announced for matter in motion, the 
methodology and its cultural impact was profound.71  This methodological 
approach characterizes much of eighteenth century thought, not simply the new 
science of physics,72 became the paradigm for all to mimic.73  Thus, Newton’s 
 
 65. BUTTS, supra note 29, at 286. 
 66. PORTER, supra note 26, at 12. 
 67. Id. at 12.  Indeed, in the first sentence of Hume’s work, An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, Hume described moral philosophy as the “science of human nature.”  DAVID 
HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS 5 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.A. Nidditch ed.,  3rd ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1777).  
Hume wrote that historical records could function like a collection of experiments by which to 
deduce the principles of his science, just as a natural philosopher “becomes acquainted with the 
nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms 
concerning them.”  Id. at 83–84; see also COHEN, supra note 64, at 19 (“Hume’s goal was to 
produce a new science of individual human moral behavior that would be equivalent to Newton’s 
natural philosophy.”).  Hume was not alone; Hobbes, Adam Smith, Marshall, Pareto, Jevons, 
among others, all borrowed from classical physics in their thinking about society.  Wendt, 35 
(Dec. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors). 
 68. BUTTS, supra note 29, at 282. 
 69. See COHEN, supra note 64, at 118.  Thus, the Leviathan begins with a discussion of 
motion and optics and proceeds to a discussion of society.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 
(Richard Tuck ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1651). 
 70. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Persistent Quest for 
Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 625 (1997); see also COHEN, 
supra note 64, at 1–99, 107 (arguing that this borrowing took the forms of analogy, homologies, 
metaphors, and identities). 
 71. COHEN, supra note 64, at 101, 108; see also Wendt, supra note 67, at 35.  Wendt argues 
that almost all of the metaphysical assumptions of the classical worldview, such as materialism, 
determinism, and atomism, were deeply ingrained in the minds of social scientists.  Id.  
Importantly, Wendt suggests that social science remains ensconced in a classical worldview, and 
variety of reasons, never adopted the quantum shift.  Id. at 36–37. 
 72. See ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 7 (Fritz C. A. Koelln 
& James P. Pettegrove trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1951). 
 73. See HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 1. 
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epistemology is found in Voltaire’s Treatise on Metaphysics,74 d’Alembert’s 
Preliminary Discourse,75 and Kant’s Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of 
Principles of Natural Theology and Morality.76  Through this methodology was 
erected an epistemological and ontological edifice that framed not simply the 
new science of the Enlightenment but the modern worldview.77 
What are these epistemological and ontological assumptions?  We now 
turn to the grammar of the Enlightenment.  Although we present these 
principles sequentially and as distinct assumptions or values, they should not 
be understood as such.  Some derive from each other, but not all, and not in a 
consistently hierarchical or linear manner.  They are better understood as nodes 
in a network of ideas that support and mutually reinforce each other.  
Additionally, we do not wish to suggest that every Enlightenment thinker 
subscribed to each principle or conceptualized them in exactly the same way.  
But on the whole, they were widely shared.  Read as a set, these ideas 
constitute the grammar of the Enlightenment Project. 
The first assumption that underpins the Enlightenment Project is the 
subject–object duality.78  The scientific method was premised on the intrinsic 
separation of the observer and the observed, the subject and the object, the 
“knower” and the “known.”79  Scientists believed they could stand at a distance 
and observe nature, from the microscopic to the celestial. 
Second, it was assumed that objectivity is possible.  The “book of nature” 
was open for the willing and disciplined observer to read.  An experiment 
conducted using proper method could be replicated by anyone, and the results 
would be the same.  Thus, the objective inquirer could deduce objective truths, 
since those truths were independent of the scientific subject. 
 
 74. See WAYNE ANDREWS, VOLTAIRE 32–33 (1981) (discussing Voltaire’s pamphlet, 
Treatise on Metaphysics). 
 75. See JEAN LE ROND D’ALEMBERT, PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE TO THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
DIDEROT (Richard N. Schwab trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1995) (1751). 
 76. See Immanuel Kant, Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural 
Theology and Morality, in THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT, 
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY 1775–70 243, 243–75 (David Walford & Ralf Meerbote eds., 1992). 
 77. The consensus was that the best route to a new science of society was to “jettison the 
traditional reliance on established authorities, such as Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastic 
‘doctors,’” just as the natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution had done.  COHEN, supra 
note 64, at 135. 
 78. It might be accurate to say that this dualism instantiates or structures of a host of other 
dualisms, which entail or follow from it.  These include: fact/value, mind/body, internal/external, 
public/private, freedom/constraint, reason/ passion, among others.  Steven L. Winter, 
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1450 
(1990). 
 79. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Comment, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical 
Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualism and Originalism, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
463, 468–69 (2002). 
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Third, it was assumed that neutrality is possible.  It was believed that the 
act of observing, the subject’s investigation of the object, does not inherently 
change either the object or the subject.  As the metaphor of the book of nature 
suggests, reading the book does not change its text or meaning.  The intrinsic 
separation between the subject and object makes neutrality possible. 
Moreover, the scientific observer is presumed capable of adopting a neutral 
orientation to the object of investigation, meaning that they are able to render 
judgments impartially on the basis of a fair reading of the data.  The norm of 
disinterestedness, that the scientist is “psychically ready to accept any truth 
that emerges” from their investigation gives us confidence in their findings.80 
If the production of scientific knowledge is tainted with human bias, then it 
cannot be said to be objective.  The objective character of science can only be 
“secured by a method that disciplines practitioners to set aside their passions 
and interests in the making of scientific knowledge.”81  The validity of the 
results of a scientific investigation depends upon the method or the procedure 
used to obtain them.  Only the methodologically disciplined reading of the 
book of nature, untainted by the Baconian habits of mind, human emotions, or 
the “passions,” allowed the discovery of such truth.82  By some accounts, this 
broad understanding of science is the major reason that the Scientific 
Revolution has been a critical turning point, or an “epoch that made the world 
modern.”83  Enlightenment thought viewed emotion as a threat to reason, an 
obstacle to logical, methodologically sound thinking.  Objectivity was only 
possible if the observer and object of observation were separate, if emotions 
could be checked, and, furthermore, if the observer was neutral and 
disinterested. 
Fourth, Enlightenment thinkers sought certainty, especially mathematical 
certainty.  The methodology of the Scientific Revolution inspired confidence in 
the production of scientific knowledge.  Enlightenment thinkers hoped to 
accommodate the new social science to this methodology, and particularly 
mathematics, which they viewed as the most elevated form known to science.84  
Consequently, they hoped that their experiments and critical observations 
would be quantifiable.  For example, the economist Léon Walras sought to 
devise a Newtonian law of price, i.e., “the price of things is in inverse ratio to 
the quantity offered and in direct ratio to the quantity demanded.”85  By 
 
 80. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE UNCERTAINTIES OF KNOWLEDGE (POLITICS, HISTORY, 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE) 11 (2004) 
 81. Id. at 162. 
 82. See HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 7–8 (listing the idols that afflict the human mind to 
prevent understanding). 
 83. SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 162. 
 84. See COHEN, supra note 64, at 101, 108. 
 85. Id. at 17–18. 
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mathematizing the relationships of man and society, Enlightenment thinkers 
aspired to scientific certainty. 
Fifth, the Enlightenment was universalist and sought to discover laws that 
were universally true.  Although the early experimentalists of the Scientific 
Revolution were more cautious and tentative in advancing universal truth 
claims, the deductive tradition of the Cartesians had no such apprehensions.  
The deductive formula depended upon universal axioms.  Newtonian science 
fused both traditions but elevated the idea of universal laws and objective truth 
in the process.86  The principles of objectivity and certainty entail universality.  
Enlightenment thinkers set upon a quest to discover the universal laws of man 
with enthusiasm using the epistemology of the Scientific Revolution. 
Sixth, the Enlightenment projected a mechanical worldview and employed 
a reductionist logic.  Reductionism is the idea that things can be understood by 
breaking them down into component parts.87  For example, matter can be 
reduced to atoms.  The mechanical universe can be reduced to motion and 
objects.  This view of the world was inspired by the prevalent imagery of a 
clock.  Since the fourteenth century, clocks of varying sizes and complexity 
were commonplace in Europe.  The increasing complexity of these machines 
provided a perfect metaphor for explaining natural processes.88  Not only was 
the universe supposed to be like a machine, operating according to discernible 
principles and defined relationships, and the creator the great clockmaker, but 
physical bodies, including living organisms, were frequently described in 
mechanical terms. 
The mechanistic metaphor, and the reductionist logic that accompanied it, 
was readily applied by Enlightenment thinkers to the state and society.  In 
Leviathan, Hobbes descries the state as “an Artificial Animal.”89  While 
analogizing the human body to a machine,90 Hobbes then assumes that the 
social aggregate of human bodies, the body politic, can also be described in 
mechanical terms.91 
 
 86. Even still, the idea of objective truths through observation was not new.  Epicurus held 
that there is an ultimate reality that our sense may guide us to understanding.  See KLINE, supra 
note 43, at 4.  The Greek writer Parmenides also popularized the subject–object duality as a way 
of discovering truths about the world, untainted by human biases or traditions.  See Goldberg, 
supra note 79, at 468. 
 87. See generally RICHARD H. JONES, REDUCTIONISM: ANALYSIS AND FULLNESS OF 
REALITY 13–36 (2000) (describing the theory of reductionism and distinguishing its primary 
types). 
 88. See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 32–33. 
 89. Id.; see COHEN, supra note 64, at 122. 
 90. HOBBES, supra note 69, at 7; see COHEN, supra note 64, at 120. 
 91. HOBBES, supra note 69, at 7. 
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Seventh, the Enlightenment put its “faith in reason.”92  It assumed that 
reason would unlock the secrets of the universe, and that its scope of 
application was limitless.  The universe and all reality were merely “virgin 
territory” awaiting the penetrating mind of the enlightened observer, whose 
ultimate product—knowledge—would give “mankind command over that 
territory.”93  It was through reason, particularly mathematical reasoning, that 
certainty—confidence regarding that knowledge—was attainable. 
Understandably, the early Enlightenment is sometimes known as the Age 
of Reason.94  Reason was the force that produced certainty, or perfect 
knowledge, because reason contained the capacity for knowing and ordering 
the world.95  Some, like Descartes and Kant, believed this ordering could be 
done a priori, before or prior to experience.96  For most of the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment philisophes, however, reason was the tool that made 
sense of empirical data.  In view of those thinkers, as well as those who 
believed “pure reason” was separate and independent of reality, reason was a 
dynamic force, an “energy” that analyzes and synthesizes.97  In contrast, the 
“passions” were regarded as a distinct, opposing force that blinded and 
concealed.  Regardless of the extent to which the Enlightenment may be 
described as the “Age of Reason,”98 Enlightenment thinkers sharply 
distinguished between rationality and emotion, privileging the former and 
disparaging the latter. 
Eighth, Enlightenment philosophers, beginning with Descartes, instantiated 
a mind–body dualism.  Enlightenment thought distinguished between mind and 
matter: we enjoy direct access to the internal, the content of our thoughts, that 
we lack for the external, prompting investigation and experimentation as a way 
of knowing the latter.  Building upon this insight, Descartes divided the world 
unconditionally between mind and body, arguing that the world contains two 
qualitatively different realms, that of matter and that of mind.99  According to 
Descartes, the mind that thinks is “an immaterial substance, and has nothing 
bodily to do with it.”  The separability of reason from emotions, and the 
elevation of reason over the “passions,” corresponded to the separation of the 
mind and the body, and the mind’s hierarchical position over matter. 
 
 92. GEORGE SOROS, THE AGE OF FALLIBILITY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 93–94 (2006). 
 93. Id. at 94. 
 94. DAVID E. COOPER, WORLD PHILOSOPHIES: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 247 (2002). 
 95. powell, The Multiple Self, supra note 11, at 1487. 
 96. Kant believed that there existed categories in the mind which all rational beings have.  
See BUTTS, supra note 29, at 285.  These are transcendental categories.  Id. 
 97. CASSIRER, supra note 72, at 13. 
 98. Porter suggests that the label “Age of Reason” is deeply misleading.  PORTER, supra 
note 26, at 2–3. 
 99. SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 57. 
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Ninth, Enlightenment thinkers conceptually distinguished between man 
and nature in several important ways.  Aristotelian teleology did not 
distinguish between human ends and natural ends, but was an integrated 
understanding of both human and natural processes.100  The rejection of 
teleology by seventeenth-century mechanical philosophers reflected the view 
that human ends differed fundamentally from natural processes.  First, the 
separation of man and nature was a logical corollary to the subject–object 
dualism (and the mind–body dualism).  From this perspective, man is the 
scientific observer, and nature is the object of scientific investigation, to be 
revealed through human experimentation and observation.101  Nature is not 
only independent of experimental practices, it is also conceptually distinct.  
Second, as the object of scientific investigation, nature is not only the object of 
our inquiry, but of our control.102  Near the end of his Discourse, Descartes 
wrote of making men “masters and possessors of nature.”103  Enlightenment 
writers lauded the goal of knowledge for its own sake, but also for the practical 
ends such knowledge might serve.104  Third, Enlightenment writers repeatedly 
posited the idea of a ‘state of nature,’ in which they described the “natural 
condition” of man in a pre-political condition.105  Enlightenment thinkers 
differed in their view of what defined the “natural condition,” but they all 
proceeded from the assumption that there was one. 
Finally, the Enlightenment Project is grounded in a particular conception 
of the self: the rational, separate autonomous individual.  This conception of 
the self is perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Enlightenment Project.  
Virtually all of the assumptions of Enlightenment epistemology and ontology 
converge toward it.  The subject–object duality marks a separation between 
things, human and “natural.”106  As this division is inscribed, the Cartesian 
ego—the immaterial, reflective self embodied in the cogito—arrives, which 
separates and then privileges mind over body, and then reason over emotion.107  
The fundamental impetus for the scientific method is the lack of privileged 
 
 100. See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 163; MONTE RANSOME JOHNSON, ARISTOTLE ON 
TELEOLOGY 4 (“Aristotle’s teleology can change the way we view and relate to other natural 
entities.  Aristotle define nature as an internal principle of change, and as an end.  He shows us 
how ends and goods can and must enter into scientific explanations.  Every natural substance is 
an end, and is identified as the beneficiary of its own parts and motions.”). 
 101. See BARAD, supra note 12, at 41.  Hence, the ‘book of nature’ metaphor. 
 102. This feature of enlightenment thought is among the main criticisms that Adorno and 
Horkheimer level at the enlightenment.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 103. RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD 35 (Donald A. Cress trans., 3d ed. 
Hacking Publishing Co. 1998) (1637). 
 104. One example is the development of new technologies or superior methods. 
 105. This concept was used by Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Hume, but most 
notably by Hobbes and Locke. 
 106. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
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access to the external world, as compared to the special access we have to our 
own internal space, which supposedly provides transparent insight into our 
intentions, motives, and thoughts. 
John Locke is one of the most influential Enlightenment philosophers, and 
his tabula rasa is perhaps as consequential as the Cartesian split for birthing 
the modern, autonomous self.  Like his compatriots Bacon and Hooke, Locke 
was fundamentally an experimentalist, devoted to the empirical approach of 
the Royal Society, and firmly opposed to scholasticism and teleology.108  Like 
Descartes and Newton, Locke embodied the rationalist tradition; he believed 
that people might use reason to examine their beliefs and opinions.109  The 
foundation of Locke’s view of the self was his conception of the tabula rasa, 
the premise that the mind is a blank slate and, therefore, that there are no 
“innate ideas.”110  Consequently, the self is stripped of essence and is now a 
product of one’s own making.111  Not only does this autonomous, rational self 
emerge from the Enlightenment; importantly, it emerges at a moment in which 
its anxiety is most acute.  The pre-modern self was embedded in the cosmic 
structure.112  The Ptolemaic worldview, particularly as it was constructed 
through Aristotelian physics and medieval Scholasticism,113 posited a cosmos 
organized according to principles of moral and anthropomorphic 
significance.114  The Copernican revolution did more than simply discredit 
Ptolemy’s map of the solar system; it toppled Aristotelian teleology and 
Platonic theory.115  The mechanical universe, particularly the one described by 
Deists, suggested a different universal order. 
According to Deism, popular among many Enlightenment thinkers, 
including Thomas Jefferson, the universe is a great machine operating 
according to natural laws conceived and put in place by God, the great 
 
 108. See SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 88. 
 109. Id. at 109 (“That there is something in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that 
Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us.  
For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseperable from it, is to beg, what is 
in Question, and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-
evident Proposition.”). 
 110. The first Book of Locke’s Essay is dedicated to dispelling the notion of “innate ideas.”  
See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 43–104 (Peter H. Nidditch 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689). 
 111. Another element of the modern self is a unity of consciousness.  The defining feature of 
the self, for Locke, was consciousness, which established both personal continuity and separation 
from others.  See SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 95. 
 112. See infra notes 326–404 and accompanying text. 
 113. Scholasticism was a revival of Aristotelian philosophy developed by Saint Thomas 
Aquinas and taught in medieval universities.  See SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 17 n.1. 
 114. Shapin, supra note 25, at 20–24; Siegel, supra note 9, at 52. 
 115. See SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 46–52; SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 20–30. 
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clockmaker.116  But once in operation, the clockmaker no longer interferes.117  
This universe distanced the creator from humanity, and removed God from 
everyday life so that God became less relevant to social or scientific 
knowledge.118  It produced a “disenchanted world,” a cold, lonely, and remote 
place, where magic, myth and God were replaced by reason and science.119  In 
that sense, the “Cartesian ego,” or the modern reflective self, arrives precisely 
at the moment when “its subjection to worldly confusion and uncertainly 
seems most complete.”120  With a few notable exceptions, little attention has 
been paid to the anxiety and fear generated by the self in the world.121 
The Enlightenment Project’s aspiration of perfect knowledge suggests the 
possibility of light without darkness.  Other contend that the brighter the light, 
the darker the shadow.122  Through enlightenment we became strangers in a 
strange land.  Mankind moved out a state of nature to a cool, hostile world.  
This engendered the Hobbesian fear of others, which, in a war of all against all, 
is the basis for the Leviathan state.  Nature needed to be conquered and bent to 
man’s will so that a home could be safely made.123  Enlightenment birthed a 
radical separation of the self from God, the cosmos, other men and even one’s 
 
 116. BUTTS, supra note 29, at 282. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. (noting deists only accepted what scientific investigation, mathematical 
description, and human reason could accept and describe as the cause of something that interfered 
with nature). 
 119. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 60, 95 (Stephen 
Kalberg trans., 2002) (1930).  It is little wonder that both the Catholic and Protestant churches in 
large part opposed the implications of the new science.  This worldview also forecloses man’s 
return to Eden because there was no Eden, just a cool universe without man at the center. 
 120. SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 9. 
 121. See DAVID LOY, A BUDDHIST HISTORY OF THE WEST 20 (2002); see generally ERNST 
BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (First Free Press 1997) (1973).  There are certainly other 
projects that challenge the Enlightenment Project and goal.  Much of the work about the anxiety 
and fear associated with the modern self is from Freud and his progeny.  See BECKER, supra, at 
101–05.  The role of the unconscious and repressed would be a serious challenge to the 
enlightenment aspiration of certainly, unity, and transparency.  In fact, it is the work of Freud that 
has laid the foundation for neuropsychology and the work related to implicit bias that will be 
discussed below.  But much of society, and certainly law, has largely ignored the teaching of 
Freud, or bracketed it.  Consider, for example, the role of intent in law.  See Charles Lawrence III, 
The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
317 (1987). 
 122. C.G. JUNG, THE SYMBOLIC LIFE: MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 318 (R.F.C. Hull trans., 
Princeton U. Press 1976) (1953). 
 123. Of course, not everyone embraced this separate worldview.  But those who rejected it 
were dismissed as irrational or suspect members of the political community. 
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own body.  The Enlightenment Project then not only put humanity at war with 
nature and each other, but also with oneself.124 
II.  ENLIGHTENMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to 
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to 
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which 
the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 
them to the separation. 
- The Declaration of Independence.125 
We live in a world shaped by the ambitious Enlightenment Project.  It is 
the foundation of modern, western society.  It concerns how we know and who 
we are.  The epistemological and ontological assumptions and practices of the 
Enlightenment affect what counts as knowledge, the way we think, and how 
we organize ourselves in society.  We will now explore how this project has 
manifested in law. 
In this section we will connect Anglo-American law, and American 
constitutional law in particular, to the Enlightenment.  Part A will discuss the 
development of natural law theories by Bacon, Grotius, and Liebniz, as attempt 
to create a scientific basis for law.  Part B will attempt to demonstrate how 
these principles were put into practice in constitutional law and other areas.  
Specifically, we will discuss the influence of Montesquieu, Locke and other 
Enlightenment thinkers on the American Revolution.  Part C will examine the 
extent to which Enlightenment assumptions remain embedded in contemporary 
law. 
A. Anglo-American Law and the Enlightenment 
Many of the naturalistic philosophers of the scientific revolution and early 
Enlightenment were leading jurists.  Sir Francis Bacon was not only a luminary 
and popularizer of the new science, he was the Attorney General and Lord 
Chancellor of England.126  His ideas were influential in English legal theory 
and, by extension, American legal theory.127  Bacon argued that employing 
empirical approaches to derive particular laws would make it more 
 
 124. This is an important insight.  To the extent it is accurate it means that Enlightenment 
Project is not just hostile to nature, to women, or “the other,” but especially those who are not 
independent, but oneself.  john a. powell, Dreaming of a Self Beyond Whiteness and Isolation, 18 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 36 (2005). 
 125. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 126. Id. 
 127. HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 14. 
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scientific.128  Bacon and other Enlightenment jurists believed that legal theory, 
the intellectual underpinning of law, is a scientific pursuit, and that law should 
be framed in scientific terms.129  Modern jurisprudence may be understood as 
an attempt to make the law more scientific.130  By scientific, it is supposed that 
the law may possess objectivity, universality, and logical rigor, even deductive 
entailment.131 
Another influential thinker was the great Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius.  By 
some accounts, Grotius achieved similar feats in the law as Galileo had 
accomplished in natural science.  Grotius argued that the problem of law arises 
from a correlation between ethics and logic, and therefore mathematics.132  He 
believed that you could begin with fundamental, universal principles and 
reason outward.133  In his treatise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, or, Law of War and 
Peace, Grotius borrowed Galilean mathematical physics.134  The mathematical 
treatment of law as a system of universal principles becomes fully realized in 
the doctrine of natural law.135 
The doctrine of natural law, which originates with Grotius, underwent 
systemic justification and elaboration, especially in the philosophy of law of 
German idealism in the works of Leibniz and Wolff.136  Leibniz, another major 
 
 128. Id. at xiii. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 467. 
 131. See John Veillieux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967 n.1 
(1987).  “Objectivity in legal theory implies the existence of non-controversial, consensus-based 
norms that . . . can be articulated by neutral observers, be they jurists or theorists.”  HACKNEY, 
supra note 32, at xiii–xiv. 
 132. CASSIRER, supra note 72, at 236. 
 133. See COHEN, supra note 64, at 109. 
 134. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. C. Campbell trans., M. 
Walter Dunne 1901) (1625), available at http://books.google.com/books/download/The_rights_ 
of_war_and_peace.pdf?id=bOwuAAAAMAAJ&output=pdf&sig=ACfU3U17gRLOEkhz5SD0L
04OzuCB-F98LQ&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0.  Grotius greatly admired Galileo, and he 
expressed as much in letters to the astronomer.  COHEN, supra note 64, at 108. 
 135. In his view, much like science and the social sciences, law had to overcome two 
obstacles.  First, it had to extricate itself intellectually from theology.  Grotius famously stated, 
“[T]he propositions of natural law would retain their validity even if one were to assume that 
there was no God or that the Deity was not concerned with human things.”  CASSIRER, supra note 
72, at 240 (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, Prolegomena, sect. XI).  Second, 
law must be protected from state absolutism, the Leviathan State.  See id. at 238.  This is 
prefigured the idea of “division of powers,” articulated by Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws, see 
id. at 21, and later embodied in the American Constitution.  The “separation of powers” notion is 
somewhat overstated in the American context, especially in the division of the judiciary, 
executive, and legislative, since the founders did not intend the judiciary to function as a check on 
the other two branches of government.  See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 51 (James Madison).  
Nonetheless, the separation of powers is visible in the U.S. Constitution. 
 136. CASSIRER, supra note 72, at 237. 
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Enlightenment thinker, was trained as a lawyer and authored legal texts.137  He 
argued that the law must also mimic mathematics and follow the deductive 
method.138  But what are the first principles of deduction?  In view of these 
thinkers, they included natural law rights, among which were security, 
property, equality, and participation in government.  According to the French 
mathematician and polymath Condorcet, the free states of America were the 
first to bring these ideas to action.139 
Interestingly, even the empiricists of the Enlightenment held fast to the 
belief in universally valid legal norms.140  Against Locke’s proof that there are 
no innate ideas, Voltaire contended that this does not mean that there are no 
universal principles of morality:141 “Nature is always in harmony with 
itself.”142  The laws of nature reveal fundamental principles, and so there are 
fundamental laws of morality.”143  Rather, these principles, much like the laws 
of nature that Newton advanced, were to be discovered and articulated.  From 
this perspective, Natural Law was formulated as an objective and scientific 
basis of law. 
B. Enlightenment and the American Revolution 
America was built in the eighteenth century on grand Enlightenment 
principles, especially that of Natural Law.144  At the time of the colonial 
rebellion in North America, the Enlightenment was at the height of its 
influence.145  The leading thinkers of the Enlightenment hoped that the 
American Revolution might put into practice the ideas that had evolved and 
emerged over the previous century in Europe.146  In fact, Enlightenment was 
the “idiom of the rebellion.”147  Its leaders were either students or colonial 
contemporaries of the European philosophes.148  Benjamin Franklin was not 
 
 137. See HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 15. 
 138. Id. 
 139. CASSIRER, supra note 73, at 236. 
 140. See CASSIRER, supra note 72, at 235. 
 141. See id. at 244. 
 142. Id. at 245. 
 143. See id. 
 144. LAKOFF supra note 20, at 6.  Lakoff sketches out how these principles were put to 
practice, starting with the capacity for reason.  See id. at 6–7.  If we can reason, then we can 
govern ourselves.  Id.  And therefore, the best form of government is democracy.  Id.  This is also 
the basis for the separation between church and state.  Id. 
 145. See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE SCIENCE OF 
FREEDOM 555 (1969).  Peter Gay points out that the “philosophes” (the leading thinkers of the 
enlightenment) had high hopes that the “science of freedom” would be applied during and after 
the American Revolution, although these thinkers were in their golden years. Id. 
 146. LAKOFF, supra note 20, at 6. 
 147. See PORTER, supra note 26, at 58. 
 148. See GAY, supra note 145, at 555. 
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only heralded by Enlightenment thinkers as a great philosopher of the age and 
praised in the world of the European salon, but he was an Enlightenment 
philosophe in his own right.149  David Hume wrote of Benjamin Franklin: “I 
am very sorry . . . that you intend soon to leave our hemisphere.  America has 
sent us many good things, gold, silver, sugar, tobacco, indigo, etc.; but you are 
the first philosopher, and indeed the first great man of letters, for whom we are 
beholden to her.”150  Franklin was also a practical scientist, an experimentalist, 
and a “man of the laboratory who did his duty as a citizen.”151  European 
voices such as Voltaire, Hume, Condorcet, and Diderot believed the 
Enlightenment could be put into practice through Franklin.152  The hopes of 
these aging philosophers would soon come to pass. 
The American Revolution transformed America from an importer of 
Enlightenment ideas to an exporter of Enlightenment practice.153  Thomas 
Jefferson, no less, was a great student of the Enlightenment.154  Jefferson 
“worshipped” Bacon, Newton and Locke.155  The Declaration of 
Independence, authored by Jefferson, is imbued with Enlightenment ideas and 
principles of Natural Law.156  In its opening sentence, the Declaration draws its 
authority from the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”157 and asserts the 
ideal of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”158  Moreover, these laws 
 
 149. GAY, supra note 145, at 555.  David Hume wrote of Benjamin Franklin: “‘I am very 
sorry . . . that you intend soon to leave our hemisphere.  America has sent us many good things, 
gold, silver, sugar, tobacco, indigo, etc.; but you are the first philosopher, and indeed the first 
great man of letters, for whom we are beholden to her.’”  Id. at 556 (quoting letter from David 
Hume to Benjamin Franklin (May 10, 1762)). 
 150. Id. at 556 (quoting letter from David Hume to Benjamin Franklin (May 10, 1762)). 
 151. Id. at 557–58. 
 152. Id. at 556–57 (“The elevation of Benjamin Franklin to mythical status was eminently 
useful to those who wished the Enlightenment well, for it supported their claim to a practicality 
that its critics had often refused to grant.”). 
 153. Id. at 558. 
 154. See id. at 559–60; see also John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The 
Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 N.W. J. L. & SOC. POL. 
195, 321 (2009) (including Jefferson as an Enlightenment thinker); BUTTS supra note 30, at 268 
(“The middle-class constitutionalism of Locke and Montesquieu was taken up by such men as 
Hamilton in America and the democratic humanitarianism of Rousseau by such men as 
Jefferson.”). 
 155. GAY, supra note 145, at 560. 
 156. Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
1, 13 (2008). 
 157. Id.  This is not just a reference to natural law theory, but also a reference to the 
Newtonian clockmaker. 
 158. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776). 
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are set against the laws of man, even Kings.159  In the next sentence, the 
Declaration describes these rights as “unalienable.”160  James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton were also students and adherents to the European 
Enlightenment.161  Even George Washington extolled the application of 
Enlightenment principles in June 1783, declaring that they constituted “the 
foundation of our Empire . . . .”162  The founding fathers of the United States, 
many of whom were leaders or students of the Enlightenment, had a “unique 
opportunity to set up an enlightened polity from scratch.”163 
But it was not simply American political elites who celebrated the “new 
science of man.”  Enlightenment ideas also entered mainstream of American 
thought.164  Pamphleteers, preachers, and authors frequently invoked 
Enlightenment ideas and referenced Enlightenment writings from Locke to 
Montesquieu expecting the audience would be familiar with the source.165  
Addressed to the public, the Federalist Papers are considered a classic work of 
the Enlightenment, on par with Rousseau’s The Social Contract.166  For the 
writers of the Federalist Papers, the “science of man” is “the systematic 
explanation of history and experience together, and the science of politics [is] 
their systematic utilization.”167  From this perspective, government is the 
institutional arrangement that mediates man’s nature and encourages service 
for the common good.168  To this end, government must rest on scientific 
principles to control man’s vices and bring out his virtues.  The solution was a 
“vigorous government not to stifle, but to protect liberty[:]” a system “that will 
guard the passions of individuals for the sake of order and guard the guardians 
for the sake of freedom.”169  That the new “science of man” embedded in the 
American Revolution was rooted in the science of Bacon and Newton is 
evident not just from its intellectual origins, but from its rhetoric as well.  The 
author “Publius” repeatedly used the word “experiment” to describe the new 
American government—and not merely as a description of the unprecedented 
nature of the endeavor, but as “self-praise” and as boast.170 
 
 159. Id. para. 1 (“The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated 
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over 
these states.”). 
 160. Id. para. 1. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 560–61. 
 163. PORTER, supra note 26, at 58. 
 164. See GAY, supra note 145, at 562–63. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 563. 
 167. Id. at 564.  For an elaboration of how the Federalist Papers are a great Enlightenment 
tract see id. at 563–65. 
 168. Id. at 564–66. 
 169. GAY, supra note 145, at 566. 
 170. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1058 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1035 
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the Constitution of 1787 
was frequently described in Newtonian terms, with “carefully counterpoised 
forces and counterforces . . . checks and balances.”171  Montesquieu believed 
that “mixed government” was a safeguard against despotism.172  As practiced 
by Enlightenment thinkers, the mixed government safeguard rested on the 
Newtonian paradigm of “clockwork precision” and oppositional forces. 
It was not simply the founding documents that were drafted under the 
influence of the Enlightenment.  The common law was caught in its sweep as 
well, primarily through the work of the famous English jurisprude Sir William 
Blackstone.  Blackstone’s Commentaries are an “[Anglo-]American 
application of Leibniz’s scientific method.”173  Commentaries are a four-
volume set of legal treatises written in the late eighteenth century that aim “to 
systematize English common law.”174  It is “the first attempt to distill English 
common law in a comprehensive way.”175  In the words of one commentator, 
Blackstone was “‘doing for the English legal system what Newton had done 
for the physical world.’”176  The “natural laws” Blackstone set out were 
“analogous to Newton’s laws of motion.”177  From these principles, particular 
legal rules were deduced.178  “In antebellum America, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries were akin to a legal bible.”179  It inspired “Americanized” 
versions of the same approach, and subsequent jurists, such as Kent and Story, 
modeled their own treatises on Commentaries.180 Today, treatises, 
restatements, and encyclopedias are the modern form of this systematic 
classification.  In the nineteenth century, legal theorist and philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham “attempted to create comprehensive systems of law[,]” even offering 
to codify the law of the United States.181 
 
 171. Tribe, supra note 19, at 3.  Note that the checks and balances idea frequently used today 
is overstated: “‘classical constitutional thought was strongly influenced by Newtonian paradigms 
of clockwork precision.’”  Goldberg, supra note 79, at 470 n. 41 (quoting Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 110 (1991)). 
 172. Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint 
Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563, 1583 (1997). 
 173. See HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 15 (analogizing Blackstone’s work to Leibniz’s 
deductive scientific method). 
 174. Id. at 16. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. (quoting DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 12 (1941). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 15. 
 179. Id. at 19. 
 180. Id. at 20. 
 181. See Veillieux, supra note 131, at 1973–74.  President James Madison turned him down.  
Id. at n. 40. 
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C. Enlightenment Assumptions in Contemporary Law 
The legacy of Newtonian science and the Enlightenment philosophy borne 
out of it pervade American jurisprudence.182  It is beyond our capacity and the 
space provided here to fully demonstrate the operation of Enlightenment 
assumptions in law.  Instead, we will highlight substantive areas and modes of 
law in which these assumptions are salient. 
Both the common law and the case law method are examples of 
Enlightenment epistemology.  The common law, by reasoning and deriving 
rules from consensual principles based on a methodology of analogy and 
inference, deductive or inductive, is viewed as “conforming to scientific 
dictates.”183  It is understood to be objective, neutral, and universalist.  
“Objectivity in legal theory implies the existence of non-controversial, 
consensus-based norms that . . . can be articulated by neutral observers, be they 
jurists or theorists.”184  In the 1870s, Harvard Law School Dean Christopher 
Langdell built the paradigmatic legal educational program around this model 
of science.185 
Like Francis Bacon, it was Langdell’s premise that the law was, ultimately, 
a scientific search for truth in the same way that physics was a search for 
universal truths.186  To Langdell, legal truth was a subcategory of scientific 
truth.  He believed that these truths could be derived through deduction.187  For 
this reason, Langdell sought to develop a law curriculum based upon a 
chronological series of English common law cases from which students and 
professors could collectively discover the true legal rules.188  For him, “there 
existed a handful of permanent, unchanging, indispensable principles of law 
imperfectly embodied in the many thousands of published judicial opinions, 
and . . . the goal of legal reasoning was to penetrate the opinions to the 
principles.”189  In other words, the cases collected in Langdell’s revolutionary 
casebooks were data points from which legal–scientific principles could be 
derived by apprentice lawyers.  Grant Gilmore writes: “The Langdellians 
sought, with considerable success, to formulate theories which would cover 
 
 182. See Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
905, 905 (1980) (“For more than one hundred and fifty years, the slogan, ‘law is a science’ has 
dominated American legal thought.”). 
 183. HACKNEY, supra note 32, at xvii. 
 184. Id. at xiii–xiv. 
 185. See Joan C. Williams, supra note 6, at 429–30; see also Winter, supra note 78, at 1455. 
 186. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) (“[A]ll the available 
materials of [the law] are contained in printed books . . . .  [T]he library is . . . to us all that the 
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists . . . .” (quoting Professor Langell, 
Harvard Celebration Speech (Nov. 5, 1887), in 3 L. Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887)). 
 187. Id. at 42. 
 188. Id. at 47–48. 
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broad areas of the common law and reduce an unruly diversity to a manageable 
unity.”190  The Langdellian case method is the dominant mode of instruction in 
contemporary law schools.191 
American administrative law is strongly influenced by the Enlightenment 
logic of reductionism, of atomizing wholes into smaller and smaller parts.192  
The fragmentation of decision-making authority is an Enlightenment feature of 
the U.S. Constitution, and the federalist structure fosters further division of 
power.  The growth of the administrative state produced a manifold increase in 
the reductionist tendency, as Congress delegates more and more decision-
making authority to federal agencies.193  These agencies are atomized into 
discrete units with specific missions, such that we have “agencies to handle 
‘environmental’ issues, some for ‘housing’ issues, others for ‘civil rights,’ and 
so on . . . .”“194  The authority of these agencies has been insulated by the 
standards of review set by Congress and the Courts.195  The reductionist 
tendency is deeply entrenched in American law. 
Few substantive areas of law are free from Enlightenment thought.  For 
instance, despite the various attempts at reform—such as the Model Penal 
Code—criminal law remains embedded in its common law origins and, 
therefore, deeply informed by Enlightenment precepts.196  In particular, the 
Enlightenment brought mens rea into criminal jurisprudence.  Beyond merely 
causing harm by a bad act, the commission of a crime requires a guilty state of 
mind.197  As early as 1644, Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of 
 
 190. GILMORE, supra note 186, at 43. 
 191. See Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of the Traditional Law 
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 456 (1996). 
 192. J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society 
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 849, 896 (1996). 
(American legal theory has evolved along the same reductionist path that characterizes 
classical science.  The fixation of legal theorists on predictable and “correct” static 
outcomes has led naturally to a way of thinking that mirrors classical scientific thought.  
Legal theorists for a long time have pursued a Theory of Everything to explain the law-
and-society system and, like classical science, have produced theories of law relying on 
voluminous, abstract, general principles that pull the theory ever deeper into the fallacies 
of reductionism). 
 193. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231 (1994) 
 194. Ruhl, supra note 192, at 909. 
 195. The Administrative Procedures Act and the Chevron doctrine are constraints that limit 
the ability of Courts or the Congress to reverse agency action.  See id. at 910; Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1983). 
 196. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 277 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting the common law origin of American criminal law). 
 197. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law (4th ed. 2008). 
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England included the maxim actus reum non facit nisi men sit rea,198 which 
means “an individual cannot be convicted of a criminal offense unless he had a 
guilty mind.”199  Likewise, Blackstone recorded the need for a “vi[c]ious will” 
before a crime was recognized.200  Today, criminal theorists channel the work 
of Blackstone, Beccaria, and Coke through the “personhood” or “autonomy” 
theory of culpability, such that the defendant must have “the substantial 
capacity and fair opportunity to: (1) understand the pertinent facts relating to 
his conduct; (2) appreciate that his conduct violates society’s moral or legal 
norms; and (3) conform his conduct to the law.”201  This is because the theory 
of blame and punishment continues to rest on notions of free choice by 
autonomous, rational actors.202  The heat of the passion “defense” is another 
application of this theory of culpability, and it reflects the Enlightenment 
ordering of reason over the “passions.”203 
Criminal law’s common law sibling, tort law, is no less enthralled with 
Enlightenment precepts.  Torts that fall under the negligence scheme have an 
elemental structure similar to that of criminal law.204  When analyzing the duty 
of care, most negligence schemes hold the duty to be that of the “reasonably 
prudent person,” a fictitious person embodying an idealized version of the 
careful everyman.205  Ostensibly, the hypothetical reasonably prudent person 
aids the fact finder in determining where the defendant stands in relation to an 
objective norm.206  In many ways, this standard is the legal embodiment of the 
Cartesian ego, a disembodied, reflective self, whose capacity to reason exists a 
priori, unaffected by the particularities of experience.207  Consequently, it is a 
standard that aspires to the universality independent of experience, a central 
goal of Enlightenment thought.  At a minimum, it reflects the Enlightenment’s 
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emphasis on reason embodied in the rationalism tradition of Locke and 
Kant.208 
Moving from the common law to modern statutory law, antidiscrimination 
law is preoccupied with the intent of the defendant in assigning liability.  The 
classic form of unlawful discrimination is known as disparate treatment.  
Disparate treatment occurs when a defendant “simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,” or other protected 
characteristics.209  To show disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that he 
or she was the subject of adverse action because of, not merely in spite of, his 
or her protected trait.210  Consequently, a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant was motivated, at least in part, by intent to discriminate.211  
Antidiscrimination law’s enjoinder ‘not to discriminate’ relies upon the 
Enlightenment assumption that decision-makers possess ‘transparency of 
mind.’212  This is the Cartesian notion that a person has privileged access to the 
content of their thought processes and direct knowledge to the workings of his 
or her own mind.213  Possessing such awareness, well-intentioned, rational 
actors are—it is supposed—able to comply with the requirements of law.  
Rational actors would not, therefore, discriminate unless they were motivated 
by a discriminatory intent. 
The influence of Enlightenment thought and practice in law goes beyond 
its role in defining or shaping our formative institutions, modes of legal 
reasoning or elements of a tort.  Consider once more the umpire analogy 
suggested by Chief Justice Roberts during his confirmation hearing.  Despite 
withering criticism,214 it is a vivid metaphor for judicial restraint.  But more 
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than circumscribing the scope of judicial behavior by suggesting a particular 
method of adjudication, the metaphor carries with it a constellation of 
commonplace assumptions about the nature and practice of law.  These 
assumptions are many of the epistemological and ontological commitments of 
the Enlightenment grammar explicated in Part I. 
Focusing on the symbolic meaning of the umpire analogy and its message 
of judicial restraint allows the more obvious assumptions contained within it to 
slip into the background.  Yet, these assumptions are what interest us.215  First, 
according to the analogy, the judges are neutral and disinterested.216  An 
umpire favors neither team (party), but rather calls plays as he or she sees 
them—impartially.  Second, judges observe the evidence presented by the 
parties.  The judge’s neutrality gives us confidence in the objectivity of his or 
her perspective.  Third, the primary role of a judge is to apply the law to the 
facts, just as umpires ‘call the game’ by applying the rules to the facts.  Fourth, 
judges do not create or change law.  The umpire’s application of the rules to 
the facts does not change the rules of the game or create new rules.  In other 
words, rule determination is a distinct step from rule application.  The process 
of determining the meaning of a rule is separate from the application of that 
rule.  Fifth, the process of adjudication is not influenced by the broader society.  
As Chief Justice Roberts put it, “[N]obody ever went to a ball game to see the 
umpire.”217  Fans and umpires do not interact.  The law and those who enforce 
law are present, but partitioned from the society in which this law operates. 
Each of these presumptions reflects an intrinsic separation between the 
subject and object, the foundational premise of the Enlightenment grammar.  
The umpire (judge) is separate from the rules of the game (the law), the facts 
(the evidence they observe), the players (the parties), the field of play (the 
courtroom and the court rules), and even the fans and spectators (the nation).218  
The neutrality and objectivity of the umpire is preconditioned upon these 
divisions. 
The intrinsic separation between the judge and the law, and idea that 
judges merely apply law to the facts, but do not create law, garners the most 
 
A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 526 
n.2 (2009) (“Of course, John Roberts was not the first person to compare the roles of judges and 
umpires.”).  Michael J. Gerhardt, The New Religion, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 399, 401 (2007). 
 215. We do not wish to suggest that each and every assumption embedded in the metaphor is 
problematic, nor do we wish to overstate the worldview conveyed by the metaphor.  Rather, we 
are attempting to show the ways in which enlightenment ontology manifests in law by 
highlighting many non-controversial background assumptions of jurisprudence. 
 216. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 1, at 55. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. 
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attention and criticism because of its message of judicial restraint.219  But the 
other four assumptions are equally important, and perhaps more so because 
they are generally uncontested. 220  Collectively, these assumptions illustrate 
the tacit operation of Enlightenment thought in contemporary law and the 
depth of that influence. 
III.  MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES 
Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing.  But an inner voice tells me that it 
is not yet the real thing.  The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any 
closer to the secret of the ‘old one’.  I, at any rate, am convinced that He does 
not throw dice. 
- Albert Einstein221 
We have argued that the Newtonian or classical model grounded the social 
sciences of the Enlightenment.  Modern science—from physics and chemistry 
to biology and psychology—has jettisoned Newtonian concepts and models in 
favor of more relational approaches.  This section surveys these sciences and 
explains selected developments.  First, we describe the twin physics 
revolutions of relativity and quantum mechanics.  Next, we identify 
complexity or systems approaches at work across a broad spectrum of 
sciences.  Finally, we survey novel developments in the mind sciences which 
have brought new attention to the unconscious and Freud.  Collectively, these 
developments challenge the epistemological and ontological principles of 
Enlightenment thought. 
A. Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics 
The natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution believed they could 
observe the world from a neutral perspective and produce an objective account.  
The neutrality of that perspective and objectivity of that account gave scientific 
researchers confidence in their findings.  Relativity and the quantum physics 
shake that confidence.  Relativity calls into question the objectivity of the 
researchers’ account of “what happened,”222 and quantum physics undermines 
 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 4, 7; see also Siegel, supra note 8, at 701 (“Judges, 
however, cannot ‘just’ decide constitutional cases according to ‘the rules’ because they cannot 
agree on what the rules are in the vast majority of the most important cases.”). 
 220. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 704 (“[A]lmost all would agree that judges should not render 
decisions according to their first-order partisan commitments or personal policy preferences.”) 
(quotation omitted). 
 221. MANJIT KUMAR, QUANTUM: EINSTEIN, BOHR, AND THE GREAT DEBATE ABOUT THE 
NATURE OF REALITY 224 (2010) (quoting Letter from Einstein to Schrödinger (May 31, 1928)). 
 222. Although Einstein still believed that there could be “an ‘objective’ observer, the 
physicist, because the laws of physics were applicable in all reference frames.”  HACKNEY, supra 
note 32, at 84. 
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the assumption that the researchers’ observations were neutral, and does not 
meaningfully change the object of investigation.  Moreover, quantum physics 
illustrates the limits of our knowledge, challenging the goal of certainty and the 
possibility of attaining perfect knowledge. 
The twin revolutions of relativity and quantum mechanics in the early 
twentieth century shattered Newtonian certainty.223  Newton’s laws of 
causation operated upon the twin assumptions of absolute linear time and 
absolute space.224  The universality of these absolute constructs produced both 
an objective account and mathematical certainty. 
Newton identified the force of gravity but was unable to explain it.  
Einstein suggested that “space itself is bent,” warped by the objects within 
it.225  Einstein’s theory of relativity posits that what we observe as gravity is as 
warped space around objects.226  According to Einstein, space is not three-
dimensional, and time is not separate from space.227  Rather, time and space 
form a four-dimensional continuum, and neither is absolute.228  Consequently, 
observers would order events differently in time if they moved with different 
velocities relative to the events observed.229 
The classical claim of certainty of deterministic properties to physical 
reality and confidence in our capacity to know these properties, was put in 
doubt.  Those doubts multiplied with the advent of quantum physics.  
According to quantum theory, observation is in fact an interaction.230  It is an 
interaction between the observer and the object of inquiry.231  This interaction 
produces effects, and these effects matter.232  In measuring any characteristic 
of an object, in observing, we disturb its pre-measurement state.233  Newtonian 
physicists were not concerned with this disturbance.  They argued that the 
experimental/observation disturbance is negligible.234  And when it is not, 
measurement-independent values can be found because the effect of the 
disturbance can be determined and subtracted out.235  Quantum physicists 
contested both claims.  First, they argued that there is a limit to how 
 
 223. Williams, supra note 6, at 436–37. 
 224. KLINE, supra note 43, at 165. 
 225. Tribe, supra note 19, at 6. 
 226. Id. at 175 (explaining curved space-time). 
 227. See id. at 175. 
 228. Id. 
 229.  Id. at 165. 
 230. Tribe, supra note 19, at 107–08. 
 231. This view may be contrasted with the classical idea that the observer could “stand at a 
distance” from nature and observe reality.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234.  Id. at 108. 
 235. BARAD, supra note 12, at 108. 
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‘negligible’ a measurement-disturbance might be.  Because of the discontinuity 
of reality (Planck’s constant), there is a lower bound to the size of the 
measurement-disturbance.236  When measuring very small objects, the 
measurement disturbance could be quite significant.  Second, they argued that 
for certain properties it is not possible to simultaneously measure both object 
of investigation and the effects of the measurement interaction/disturbance.237  
To do so would require mutually exclusive measuring apparatuses.238  
Consequently, the measurement disturbance cannot be subtracted out. 
This is the idea behind Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.  This 
principle expresses a limit to our knowledge: we cannot know the exact 
position and the momentum of an electron simultaneously.239  The more we 
know about a particle’s position, the less we know about its momentum, and 
vice versa.240  The uncertainty principle is a fundamental challenge to 
Newtonian physics, which assumed that all objects have position and 
momentum, and that these properties are simultaneously knowable.  In 
addition, it is a challenge to classical determinism, which assumed that the 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 108–09. 
 238. Measuring simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle is a classic example 
of the measurement interaction problem.  This account is taken from BARAD, supra note 12 at 
110–13 & fig.12.  The set-up for such a measurement is deceptively simple; one needs a camera, 
a tripod, and a dark room.  The camera’s flash briefly illuminates the particle so that its position 
can be determined, the tripod ensures that the camera remains fixed so that the image isn’t 
blurred, and the dark room minimizes the amount of momentum that light imparts on the particle 
being measured.  The first problem is the fixed photographic plate mounted on the tripod.  The 
plate must be fixed in order to determine position, because if the plate moves during the 
experiment, the picture of the particle would be blurry.  But, in contrast, to determine the 
particle’s momentum, the plate must be moveable, because there must be some way to measure 
how much the platform moves when the plate absorbs the momentum transfer.  See id. at 112 
fig.12.  In short, then, “the position and momentum are not simultaneously determinate because 
they require mutually exclusive experimental circumstances.”  Id. at 111 (emphasis removed).  
The second, related, problem is that the experiment requires at least one photon to move the 
particle so that it will register on the photographic plate.  This single photon, however, is 
sufficient to disturb the particle’s position.  The task, then, is to determine the effect of the 
measurement interaction.  Here one faces the same problem described above: It is impossible to 
determine simultaneously both the position and momentum of the photon; doing so requires 
mutually exclusive experimental apparatuses.  The upshot of this is “Bohr’s conclusion [that] 
observation is only possible on the condition that the effect of the measurement is 
indeterminable.”  Id. at 113 (emphasis removed).  In other words, an object doesn’t have some 
abstract property called “position;” rather, an accurate depiction of an object’s position must 
always be tethered to the experimental apparatus that made its measurement possible. 
 239. For complementary variables (variables that require mutually exclusive apparatuses to 
detect), such as position and momentum, certainty in one of the variables “implies complete 
uncertainty in the other.”  HANS C. OHANIAN, PRINCIPLES OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 348 (1990). 
 240. BARAD, supra note 12, at 19. 
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initial values of the position and momentum can be used to predict future 
position and momentum.241 
Whereas Heisenberg suggested a tradeoff in our ability to know given the 
uncertainty in our measurements, Heisenberg’s mentor, Niels Bohr, suggested 
a slightly different account of the problem.  According to Bohr’s Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the problem is not simply that we cannot 
acquire precise information regarding both the position and momentum of an 
electron.  Rather, objects do not have determinate or well-defined positions and 
momenta simultaneously.242  The kind of objective knowledge emanating from 
the Newtonian science is not merely unobtainable; it does not exist.243 
Under the Copenhagen interpretation, reality is probabilistic, not 
determinate, and composed of “diffuse potentialities.”244  According to Bohr, 
“the reality of the electron is neither known nor knowable to us as a classical 
‘object’” of scientific investigation.245  Instead, the properties of an object or 
phenomena become determinate only in relationship to a measuring 
apparatus.246 According to the orthodox interpretation, the quantum 
 
 241. OHANIAN, supra note 239, at 349; John C. Sommerer, The End of Classical 
Determinism, 16 JOHNS HOPKINS TECH. DIGEST 333, 333 (1995). 
 242. Regarding objects and their momenta, 
[T]he quantum-mechanical probability distribution does not reflect our ignorance of the 
instantaneous position and momentum, but rather the non-existence of any well-defined 
position and momentum.  The quantum-mechanical system does not consist of particles 
with well-defined albeit unknown positions and momenta, but of “particles” with 
intrinsically indeterminate positions and momenta. 
OHANIAN, supra note 239, at 346.  See also BARAD, supra note 12, at 19.  For more on the 
Copenhagen interpretation, see OHANIAN, supra note 239 at 342–50. 
 243. There is a deep indeterminacy that is not just present in postmodernism or hermeneutics, 
but also in what we think of as physical reality. 
 244. OHANIAN, supra note 239, at 351.  As Ohanian notes: 
In contrast to the classical characterization of the state of a system, where the 
instantaneous coordinates [position] and momenta give us a detailed picture of the 
…configuration of the system, the quantum-mechanical characterization by means of the 
state vector gives us merely the probabilities for the outcome of measurements that we 
can perform on the system. 
OHANIAN, supra note 239, at 344.  The wave function is the probability distribution of the 
phenomena.  See id.  It determines all possible observables.  Id.  But more than that, it also 
“determines the expectation values of all observables.”  Id. 
 245. JEREMY W. HAYWARD, SHIFTING WORLDS, CHANGING MINDS: WHERE THE SCIENCES 
AND BUDDHISM MEET 19 (1987). 
 246. Id. at 109.  The question of the true nature of light is a classic example of the problem: is 
light a particle, or is it a wave?  Evidence that emerged in the early twentieth century suggested 
that light behaved like a particle in certain circumstances but like a wave in others.  Id. at 99.  
Amidst this debate, Bohr conceived of a thought experiment involving two experimental 
apparatuses.  The first apparatus consists of a partition with two slits in front of a screen.  See id. 
at 101 fig.8.  When particles are fired through the partition, the resulting pattern “shows that the 
bulk of particles are found directly across from the slits,” as would be consistent with a particle.  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1068 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1035 
mechanical probability distribution of phenomena suffers a “collapse” or 
“reduction” into a determinate position or property at the moment of 
measurement, brought on by the measuring apparatus.247 
This account suggests a relationship between the properties of an object or 
phenomenon and the experimenter that is not present in the classical paradigm.  
Newtonian physics assumed that objects and observers were physically and 
conceptually distinct.248  It assumed the existence of individual objects with 
determinate properties, and that these properties are independent of 
 
Id. at 102.  In contrast, when waves are directed at the same partition, they emerge on the other 
side, and spread out while interfering with each other, in a wave pattern.  Id.  For graphical 
representations, see id. at 103 fig.9.  These results are consistent with classical physics: particles 
behave like particles, and waves behave like waves.  But what happens when the two-slit 
experiment is performed with electrons?  Although the electrons that pass through the slits leave 
individual marks on the screen, the overall pattern is that of wavelike.  Id. at 104 fig.10.  This 
result is inconsistent with classical physics, which predicts that electrons would behave like 
particles.  Furthermore, the result obtains even if the electrons are fired one at a time, eliminating 
the possibility of mutual interference.  Id. at 102.  To address this apparent conundrum, Bohr 
imagined a second apparatus: a two-slit apparatus modified to determine which slit an individual 
electron passes through before hitting the screen.  Id. at 102–03; see also id. at 105 fig.11.  Any 
particle or electron must pass though one slit or the other.  Id. at 104.  In doing so, Bohr hoped 
that he would be able to catch the electron behaving either like a particle or a wave.  See id.  The 
surprising result of firing electrons into a which-path device is the destruction of the wave pattern.  
“That is, if a measurement is made that identifies the electron as a particle . . . then the result will 
be a particle pattern, not the wave pattern” produced earlier by the plain two-slit device.  Id.  
Bohr’s interpretation of the situation is that the two mutually exclusive apparatuses produce two 
different kinds of electron behavior (wave and particle).  Either we can obtain which-path 
information and particle patterns with one apparatus, or we can obtain the wave pattern with the 
other, but not both at the same time.  In respect, the nature of phenomenon is apparatus-
dependent.  This notion is absolutely opposed to classical physics, which understood light (or 
matter) to be either a wave or a particle. 
 247. OHANIAN, supra note 239, at 350.  The popular alternative to the orthodox Copenhagen 
interpretation suggests that the waveform does not collapse; rather, the measuring apparatus is 
treated in quantum terms as fully as the object of system of investigation.  See id. at 362.  From 
this perspective, the apparatus is treated as a “state vector” or waveform, and that waveform 
interacts with the waveform of the object of investigation.  Id.  The measurement is simply the 
“joint state vector” of those two waves.  Id.  The wave does not collapse, but the results for the 
expectation values are the same as though it had.  Id. at 362–63.  This account could be viewed as 
even more holistic than the Copenhagen perspective, since the apparatus is fully part of the 
quantum system (some interpretations even suggest that the mind of the observer is responsible 
for the wave collapse).  Id. at 365.  It also follows that reality is even less deterministic from this 
perspective, since it may suggest that we only know something by the probabilistic wave 
distributions’ interaction with another. 
 248. See id. (characterizing Bohr’s theory of the relationship of physicist and subject as a 
challenge to the Newtonian assumption that physicist and subject are completely independent).  
Recall the metaphor of the book of nature, and the attendant notion that reading a book does not 
change its text.  Supra text accompanying note 87. 
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experimental investigations.249  From a quantum mechanical perspective, the 
attributes of the phenomena under investigation only exist, in precise terms, in 
relation to the apparatus used to measure them.250  Since the experimenter 
necessarily contributes to the phenomena he or she is observing, we might 
characterize this relationship as an interaction.  Through this relationship, 
however, the subject and object become reconstituted as parts of the same 
system.  The experimental observation and measurement disturbance is not 
unidirectional, but affects the entire system.251  In that sense, this interaction is 
really an intra-action within that system.252 
The observer and the observed are not just affected in their respective 
movement or position, but in their constitution, and the subject and object 
duality dissolves.  In other words, we become a part of the nature that we seek 
to understand.  The shift, then, from the classical to the quantum model is more 
than a shift in how we know or what we know, but who we are.  When we look 
at the universe, we change the universe, and the universe looks back and 
changes us.  The advent of quantum physics not only calls into question the 
first four Enlightenment assumptions explicated in Part II, the assumption of 
subject–object duality, of observation neutrality, of objectivity, of certainty and 
determinism, but it also calls into question the general metaphysics of 
individualism that sustains the models of the individual, autonomous self. 
B. General Systems Thinking and Complexity Theory 
The classical model of science was a reductionist paradigm.  The 
clockwork metaphor of the universe was a mechanical model of the 
universe,253 whose parts could be analyzed, and whose relationships could be 
discovered, yielding deterministic answers.  Even biological entities were 
 
 249. See BARAD, supra note 12, at 106 (discussing the implications of Bohr’s discovery on 
Newtonian physics). 
 250. OHANIAN, supra note 239, at 351. 
According to the Copenhagen interpretation, quantum systems in themselves do not have 
sharply defined attributes, only diffuse potentialities, which are capable of becoming 
sharply defined when we perform suitable measurements.  The attributes of a quantum 
system depend on the apparatus used to measure them, and they exist only in relation to 
this apparatus.  Thus, the attributes are a joint property of the system and the apparatus.  
This intimate symbiotic relationship between system and apparatus implies a break with 
naive [sic] realism, according to which the attributes of a physical system belong to the 
system in itself, and they are supposed to exist independently of the environment 
surrounding the system. 
Id. 
 251. BARAD, supra note 12, at 107–08.  For example, the wave function collapses.  OHANIAN, 
supra note 239, at 350. 
 252. BARAD, supra note 12, at 128 (emphasis added). 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 22–116. 
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understood using a similar logic, through dissection.254  The limitations of the 
linear, reductionist model spurred new paradigms in biology, medicine and 
epidemiology, engineering, organizational management, and a host of other 
sciences and social sciences.255  In epidemiology, the spread of disease did not 
seem to yield single-factor explanations, nor was it reducible to its component 
parts.256  An understanding of the production of disease could not be 
accomplished by thorough knowledge of component causes.257  Rather, various 
component causes were sometimes present and sometimes not, often 
interacting in context-specific ways.258  Multi-factor etiology of disease 
transmission began to reorient medical research.259 
Systems thinking and related approaches, such as chaos theory, developed 
in the mid-twentieth century to broadly challenge the mechanical worldview 
and its reductionist logic, and to describe these new paradigms.260  A system is 
defined as an interdependent group of agents working together as a whole.261  
The biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy coined the term “general system theory” 
to suggest that there are general properties that can be used to describe all 
systems.262  It was later popularized by Lotfi Zadeh, en electrical engineer at 
Columbia University.263 
 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 86–116 (discussing Descartes automata).  The 
mechanical metaphor remains embedded in notions of science.  Even reference to classical 
philosophy is sometimes described as “mechanical philosophy.”  SHAPIN, supra note 26, at 30. 
 255. See, e.g., Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2005) (noting 
application of systems theory to biology, ecology, astrophysics); Ian L.G. Wadley, U.S. and 
Them: Hubs, Spokes, & Integration with Reference to Transboundary Environment and Resource 
Issues, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 572, 574 (2003) (ecology, computer science, engineering, 
epidemiology, sociology); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking 
Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 
525 (2006) (business management). 
 256. Nancy Krieger, Epidemiology and the Web of Causation: Has Anyone Seen the Spider?, 
39 Soc. Sci. & Med. 887, 890–91 (1994). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. fig. 2. 
 259. See id. at 891 (discussing the role of “web of causation” theory in the development of the 
“multifactoral etiology of disease”). 
 260. With respect to chaos theory, see Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice 
Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 331, 348 (1993). 
 261. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 482 (1997).  
The definition of a system varies from author to author.  We adopt a comparatively simple 
definition here since we feel that many of the additional definitional elements often given are 
insights of systems behavior rather than being definitional in nature.  The agents “might be the 
atoms that interact to form a molecule; the bones, organs, and tissues that constitute the human 
body; the sun and planets that together form the solar system; or the police, lawyers, judges, 
courts, prisons, and computer programs that together make up the ‘criminal justice system.’”  Id. 
 262. LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, 
DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATIONS 32 (1968).  As he pointed out, “There are many instances where 
identical principles were discovered several times because the workers in one field were unaware 
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In addition to a rejection of reductionism prevalent in the mechanical view 
of the world, systems approaches brought into view a different understanding 
of causality.264  A prevalent feature of classical approaches to causality is what 
Joanna Macy calls the “linear unidirectional [causal] paradigm.”265  Until the 
development of systems theory and later complexity theory in the 1980s as an 
outgrowth of systems approaches, linear causality was the standard account of 
change.266  But in many dynamic systems, this notion of linear causality is 
incapable of explaining what actually happens. 
The problem is not simply the claim that A causes B, but the assumption 
that all causal factors are organized into linear causal chains, such that we can 
only understand the role of other causes through their relationship to the 
proximate cause.267  Thus, A causes B causes C, and A’s causal relationship to 
C is mediated by the intervening cause B along the causal chain.  Even as 
science recognizes the reality of multiple causes, these causes are forced into 
linear chains.268  For example, the seemingly non-linear metaphor of a food 
web, which superseded the metaphor of a food chain, is merely an aggregation 
of possible chains.  Any given path along the web is a chain.  This form of 
complexity is merely the sum of, and reducible to, a set of linear relationships. 
In contrast, systems approaches are fundamentally non-linear.  As Ludwig 
von Bertalannfy wrote, “[T]his scheme of isolable units acting in one-way 
causality has proved to be insufficient . . . .  [W]e must think in terms of 
systems of elements in mutual interaction.”269  Mutual causation is the 
recognition that outcomes are the result of many causes acting in concert to 
produce an effect, rather than multiple causes operating through linear chains 
or a single, proximate cause.  In a system, there is no identifiable [single or 
 
that the theoretical structure required was already well developed in some other field.  General 
system theory will go a long way towards avoiding such unnecessary duplication of labor.” Id. at 
33–34. 
 263. See DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZZY LOGIC 22 (1993) (explaining that 
Zadeh’s conception of system theory—distinct from Von Bertalanffy’s—is now the dominant 
understanding of system theory). 
 264.  See generally, e.g., JOANNA MACY, MUTUAL CAUSALITY IN BUDDHISM AND GENERAL 
SYSTEMS THEORY: THE DHARMA OF NATURAL SYSTEMS (1991) (discussing the similar 
approaches of Buddhism and general systems theory to understanding causation). 
 265. Id. at 9–14. 
 266. RICHARD OGLE, SMART WORLD: BREAKTHROUGH CREATIVITY AND THE SCIENCE OF 
NEW IDEAS 21 (2007). 
 267. This is the linear model of causation that flows most powerfully from the Enlightenment.  
The idea of a “root cause” or an “active ingredient” belies this understanding. 
 268. See id. at 23 (“[Analytical reasoning’s] unbreakable commitment to continuity . . . forces 
it to proceed one step at a time, instead of making long-distance leaps typical of imaginative 
thinking [and of which network-oriented thinking is well-suited].”). 
 269. BERTALANFFY, supra note 262, at 45. 
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proximate] cause of change.270  Instead, the dynamic properties of the system 
as a whole “guide and shape the system’s parts into their resultant state.”271  
From that perspective, the language of causality itself is somewhat misleading.  
A particular “input does not ‘cause,’ in a proximate or ultimate sense, an 
outcome in a system; it only modifies existing processes which produce those 
outcomes.”272  As the sociologist Gunnar Myrdal wrote over half a century 
ago,”In an interdependent system of dynamic causation there is no ‘primary 
cause’ but everything is cause to everything else.”273  Effects produce feedback 
loops that, in turn, shape and affect the initial inputs.274  A feedback loop is an 
effect generated by the system that, in turn, affects system behavior.  In other 
words, feedback loops are causal factors that are produced by the system itself. 
The ubiquity of systems demonstrates that the Newtonian viewpoint—and 
its assumption of linear unidirectional causality—is too simple.  Consider the 
stock market.  Our inability to predict and manage the market is because of our 
connection to it.275  Our attitudes, our analysis, and our thinking about the 
market affect the market.  And when the market changes, it in turn affects our 
assumptions.276  The feedback loops within the market exist between the 
elements of the system, but we inhabit those loops ourselves.  In that sense, we 
are really studying the relationships within a process or between processes.  
There are no independently existing things in the way Newtonian science 
 
 270. OGLE, supra note 266, at 21. 
 271. Id. at 21. 
 272. Stephen Menendian & Caitlin Watt, Systems Thinking and Race Primer 5 (Dec. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://4909e99d35cada63e7f75747 
1b7243be73e53e14.gripelements.com/publications/systems_thinking_and_race_primer_july2009.
pdf. 
 273. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 78 (1962). 
 274. An article about the 2008 financial crisis contains a succinct and helpful explanation of 
feedback loops: 
A positive feedback loop is a system that responds to a stimulus by producing additional 
stimuli in the same direction.  In contrast, a system that responds to stimulus in the 
opposite direction is called a negative feedback system.  Positive feedback loops lead to 
exponential growth and dramatic movement away from the point of origin, often with 
explosive and destabilizing results.  Negative feedback loops are self-correcting and self-
stabilizing. 
Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 288 
n.173 (2009). 
 275. See GEORGE SOROS, supra note 92, at 7. 
 276. See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW 
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
(2009) (explaining that human psychology influences the financial markets and that the financial 
markets influence human psychology). 
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suggests.  Things are interconnected processes without clear boundaries.277  A 
systems model shifts focus from studying things to studying the relationships 
between things.  These relationships are dynamic and constantly evolving, 
rather than static.278  In addition, in studying the relationship, much like the 
quantum model, we become a part of the relationship.  We are not studying the 
relationship or the system from a distance, but our act of observing itself 
becomes a feedback loop. 
The idea of emergence, of outcomes produced without either a calculating 
mind or a primary or proximate cause, of “‘a web without a spider,’ built 
without anyone at the center directing things” runs against our modern 
intuitions.279  Steven Johnson refers to the inference that there must be some 
kind of centralized authority behind collective behavior as the “myth of the ant 
queen.”280  It is a product of our Enlightenment epistemology, a model of 
causality oriented by a search for root or primary causes, and impelled forward 
by the Cartesian anxiety, a compulsion to create order out of chaos. 
C. The Mind Sciences 
Like other sciences of Enlightenment pedigree, “psychologists 
mimicked . . . physicists, by looking for equally compact solutions to questions 
about mental processes.”281  The analytic strategy of reductionism, according 
to MIT Professor Marvin Minsky, failed to discover any set of laws that could 
account for “any large realms of human thought.”282  In his view, the sciences 
of the mind failed to make significant progress for nearly three centuries.283  In 
the last two decades, there has been an explosion of research into the brain and 
mind sciences, and Congress dubbed the 1990s the “Decade of the Brain.”284  
Research in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence, 
among other fields, has produced new understandings about the mind that 
directly contest Enlightenment assumptions. 
 
 277. See MACY, supra note 264, at 149 (explaining that the body and mind are inseparable 
parts of a single whole). 
 278. This carries an important implication for researchers: one cannot hold other variables 
static while changing the variable one wishes to investigate; changing the variable under 
investigation necessarily changes the other variables. 
 279. OGLE, supra note 266, at 112.  But this is exactly what emergence is: a self-organizing 
dynamic of systems as a whole.  Systems reach a tipping point, where a higher-level pattern 
emerges from the activity of lower-level elements.  STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE 29, 33 
(2001). 
 280. JOHNSON, supra note 279, at 33. 
 281. MARVIN MINSKY, THE EMOTION MACHINE: COMMONSENSE THINKING, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 14 (2006). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Library of Congress, Project on the Decade of the Brain, http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2010). 
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Contrary to the Enlightenment assumption, the mind does not and cannot 
observe and reflect either the world or itself as it is.  The body of research 
described in this section illustrates how our experience of the world, both the 
raw sensory input of experience and our interpretation, or processing, of that 
input, is filtered or preconditioned.  The mechanisms by which this filtering 
occurs are described in various ways, but they all operate, at least in part, 
beyond conscious awareness, and are only indirectly accessible or measurable.  
Moreover, the Enlightenment conception of the mind—the consciousness of 
the rational, unitary self—is no longer tenable. 
Research into the mind sciences and related fields has identified 
mechanisms by which our experience of the world is filtered and 
preconditioned.  These mechanisms are described in several ways, and their 
particular conceptualization varies depending on the discipline from which 
they emerge and the author, but they each share similar features.  They each 
suggest the ways in which both the raw sensory input of experience and the 
interpretation of that input is conditioned upon prior experience. 
Consider Wittgenstein’s famous duck/rabbit image:285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some people perceive the image to represent a duck, and others perceive 
the image to represent a rabbit.  Generally, only after further study, or after 
being told by others of the other image, do they come to ‘see’ the other one.286  
The point is that a person’s experience of this image is more than mere sensory 
input.  The image itself is merely a curved line and dot.  That input is 
interpreted in a particular way depending upon that individual’s experience.  
“What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his 
previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see.”287  As a scientist, 
there can be no data, nothing to measure or report, without a framework for 
conceptualizing what it is that is being observed.288  In that context, Thomas 
 
 285. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 204 (P. M. S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds., 2010). 
 286. The principle applies to many optical ‘illusions.’ 
 287. KUHN, supra note 34, at 113.  Some people can look at an object and perceive it in one 
way, while others will perceive it in another way, depending on their respective beliefs about the 
object.  Id. at 111. 
 288. For example, in measuring air, one needs a conception of what air is.  According to 
Kuhn, paradigms mediate not just our immediate sensory perception, but they construct our world 
in the process.  Id. at 45–46. 
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Kuhn called such a framework a ‘paradigm.’289  Cognitive psychologists call 
them ‘schemas.’290  Others describe the mechanism in which sensory input is 
filtered by cognitive information as ‘framing.’ 
In his classic text Frame Analysis, sociologist Erving Goffman suggested 
that all experience is organized through conceptual frames.291  Frames may 
“consist of values, metaphors, symbols, language, messages, and 
messengers.”292  Conceptual frames actually mediate our perceptions of reality 
by sorting information into pre-existing categories.293  When looking into a 
field of view, we see a constellation of objects, but to the mind, these objects 
are neither undifferentiated or completely differentiated matter; instead, this 
information is quickly assimilated and sorted into categories, which in turn 
have been created and organized by prior experience.  If we were to see 
everything in its particularity, we would become quickly overwhelmed.  The 
world might appear to us as a Jackson Pollack painting.  These filters are 
therefore helpful shortcuts, and probably necessary to survival.294 
They also help us create meaning, since various frames have different 
constellations of associations.295  Indeed, how we make sense of the world is 
affected by frames at every stage from perception to conscious 
understanding.296  The way an issue is framed matters, therefore, because it 
affects the way in which the brain processes information.  Suppose a magician 
presents a table with two hats and asks an audience which hat a rabbit is 
concealed within.  The question prompts the brain to analyze the situation and 
consider possible answers in a particular way.297 
Metaphors are particularly powerful frames because they not only help us 
sort information into existing categories, but actually create and organize the 
 
 289. Id. 
 290. Krieger, Content of Our Categories, supra note 212, at 1199. 
 291. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
EXPERIENCE 21 (1974).  All perception is linked to frames about some object.  Wittgenstein’s 
duck/rabbit image appears to the viewer as either a duck or a rabbit depending upon which frame 
is activated. 
 292. The Center for Social Inclusion:  A Project of the Tides Center, Thinking Change:  Race 
Framing and the Public Conversation on Diversity: What Social Science Tells Advocates About 
Winning Support for Racial Justice Policies, 2 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.centerfor 
socialinclusion.org/publications/?url=the-diversity-advancement-project-thinking-change. 
 293. Id. at 18. 
 294. See Krieger, Content of Our Categories, supra note 212, at 1199. 
 295. Consequently, we find ourselves in a world of meaning “in just the same way that [we] 
find [our]selves in a world of space and time.”  Winter, supra note 78, at 1485 (quoting Paul W. 
Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 57–58 (1989)). 
 296. Id. at 1496. 
 297. Because questions are often posed in this way, we have a number of sharp false 
dichotomies.  For example, the nature/culture question poses the same problem. 
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categories themselves.298  They can force us to make new associations and 
provide new insights and new meanings.299  As such, metaphors have often 
been instrumental in the development scientific thought.300  For example, the 
metaphor of a chain to describe predator–prey relationships has been used to 
map out observations and organize taxonomic relationships.  We saw earlier 
how the metaphor of a clock spurred research into physical sciences, including 
Newton’s laws of motion.  Another example is the metaphor of war, such as 
the war of drugs or the war on poverty.  President Reagan’s reorienting the 
issue of drug abuse in the frame of war changed attitudes about drugs and 
rebranded it a criminal justice rather than a health issue.301  In that way, frames 
reorganize information and influence how information is perceived or 
understood by others.302 
It is not just that our interpretation of sensory input is filtered through 
cognitive frames, schemas or conceptual paradigms.  Sensory perception itself 
is conditioned by and depends upon prior beliefs and experience.303  Put 
another way, sensory perception is not a distinct step from the interpretation of 
that input.  The belief contexts, cognitive frames, or paradigms that filter our 
experience of the world also influence what we perceive.304  It affects what we 
look at, not just how we understand what we experience, because it suggests 
 
 298. Id.; see also LAKOFF, supra note 20, at 96–98 (listing some organizational metaphors); 
DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE 
NATION, 96–98 (2007) (discussing the use and impact of metaphors in politics).  We 
conceptualize the idea of ‘sorting’ as placing an object into a preexisting category.  For example, 
putting a particular piece of paper into either Pile A or Pile B.  Organizing information also 
dictates the categories in the first place.  The Center for Social Inclusion, supra note 292, at 2.  
Thus, organizing information does not only sort; it creates.  Nor is it a matter of getting to the 
world behind our perspective: the world is constantly being co-created.  See supra Sections III.B–
C (discussing the inseparability of the observer and the thing observed). 
 299. Nancy Krieger, Epidemiology and the Web of Causation: Has Anyone Seen the Spider?, 
39 Soc. Sci. & Med. 887 (1994). 
 300. See id. 
 301. Julian Buchanan & Lee Young, The War on Drugs—A War on Drug Users?, 7 DRUGS: 
EDUCATION, PREVENTION & POL’Y 409, 411–12 (2000). 
 302. As a verb, framing refers to the way in which an idea is presented and subsequently 
interpreted.  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 36–37 (2008) (explaining 
framing).  The supporting details, context, and other cues can change the presentation of an idea 
and consequently affect the way in which the audience perceives the idea.  Id.  Frames can be 
used to encourage some interpretations while discouraging others.  Id. 
 303. See id. at 112.  In fact, the framework and incident filtering process is a “prerequisite to 
perception itself.”  KUHN, supra note 34, at 113. 
 304. HAYWARD, supra note 245, at 8.  A belief context is broader than the idea of a 
‘paradigm’ advanced by Kuhn.  Id. at 7 (“‘[B]elief context’ points beyond the narrower idea of 
‘paradigm.’”).  A paradigm is merely a set of beliefs, but a belief context “refers to the deepest 
levels of perceptual readiness.”  Id. at 8. 
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what is relevant and what is to be filtered out.305  The alternative is not some 
theoretical, objective, fixed vision, but perception through an alternative 
paradigm or a different belief context.306  Thus, the idea of an objective, 
neutral stance must be called into question.  Whether through Kuhnian 
“paradigms,” Goffmanian “frames,” or belief contexts, none of us is a neutral 
observer of the world, even at the level of everyday sensory perception.  Our 
various acts of making sense of the world are unavoidably shaped by our prior 
beliefs and expectations. 
The mechanisms that mediate our experience—both our perception of 
sensory input and our interpretation of that input—demonstrate the degree of 
interaction of the mind with the world.  Cognitive scientists, researchers in 
artificial intelligence, psychologists, and philosophers are all exploring the 
ways in which the mind “extends out into the world.”307  According to Andy 
Clark, “[T]he human mind was never contained in the head.”308  Synthesizing 
research in the mind sciences, Clark explains that given the level of 
information we process, the mind “could barely function at all without external 
help of some kind.”309  This “extended mind” engages and interacts closely 
with us, “shaping and organizing our thinking.”310  The extended mind is a 
challenge to the traditional Cartesian conception of the mind’s internal self-
sufficiency.  Moreover, the Cartesian split itself must also be called into 
question.311 
Enlightenment thinkers gave special priority to the mind and internal 
processes.312  It was this domain that we could know best of all: the external 
world might be imperfectly knowable, but our internal world was fully 
 
 305. This is also called ‘perceptual readiness’ by the psychology Jerome Bruner: 
Perceptual readiness is the tendency of the organism, human or animal, to be set to 
perceive in a certain way, that is to have expectancies about its environment that 
predetermine to some extent what it perceives.  Bruner showed many years ago that not 
only do we tend to perceive something in our environment more readily if we already 
expect to perceive it, but also that we have much more difficulty than usual perceiving 
something that we are preset not to perceive. 
Id. at 8. 
 306. See id. at 14 (explaining that what we consider objective reality is merely one more 
paradigm influenced by medieval Christianity). 
 307. OGLE, supra note 266, at 2. 
 308. Id. at 10. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 13.  As part of the mind’s engagement with the world, we each have recourse to a 
“vast array of culturally and socially embodied idea-spaces that populate the extended mind.”  Id. 
 311. Gila Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. 
WOMAN & L. 43, 63 (2005) (explaining the Cartesian split). 
 312. J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1976 
(“The Cartesian cogito becomes transformed: Instead of ‘I think therefore I am,’ we have ‘I think 
as I am.’”). 
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accessible to us.  Enlightenment thinkers assumed that a person can have 
complete self-knowledge, that we can observe our selves, that we can know 
our thoughts, and that we can know what motivates us.  Contrary to the 
Enlightenment assumption, some parts of the brain perform work that the other 
parts are sometimes unable to observe.313  The mechanisms that mediate our 
experience—both our sensory perception and our interpretation of that input—
all operate, at least in part, beyond conscious awareness, and are only 
indirectly accessible or measurable.  Nearly a century after Freud’s ‘discovery’ 
of the unconscious, modern science has shown that there are mental processes 
at work of which we are not aware and cannot consciously control.314  
Neuroscientists are investigating the shifting boundary between conscious and 
unconscious cognitive processes.  Recent estimates suggest that as much as 
98% of what the brain does is outside of conscious awareness.315  That means 
that as little as 2% of ‘thinking’ that the brain does is conscious.  Others 
suggest that cognition is actually an aggregate of nearly twenty concurrent 
processes, only some of which are conscious.316 
Much of the mind operates, makes decisions, organizes, and processes 
information at a level below consciousness.  It turns out that these processes 
are necessary for both survival317 and intelligence.318  Our ancestors had to 
make split-second decisions to survive predation, just as our modern-day 
counterparts must make split-second, unconscious decisions to avoid being hit 
by a car or to strike letters quickly on a keyboard.  These automatic decisions 
are not a result of the reflective, conscious mind.  If you had to consider the 
 
 313. See id. at 105. 
 314. Although subject to withering criticism for the better part of the twentieth century, 
aspects of Freud’s theory of the subject have been confirmed by contemporary neuroscience and 
social psychology, namely, research on cognitive and implicit bias, which shows that human 
cognition is pervasively shaped by factors that are outside conscious control.  See Avital 
Mentovich & John T. Jost, The Ideological “Id”? System Justification and the Unconscious 
Perpetuation of Inequality, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1102–04 (2008) (explaining the acceptance 
of Freudian elements in Gordon Allport’s work).  Scientists have begun to probe the murky 
depths of the mind, including the mind’s “adaptive unconscious.”  See MALCOLM GLADWELL, 
BLINK 11–12 (2005) (defining “adaptive unconscious”). 
 315. See LAKOFF, supra note 20, at 3. 
 316. See MINSKY, supra note 281, at 94–129 (discussing the complexity of consciousness). 
 317. See Krieger, Content of Our Categories, supra note 212 at 1188 (“If our species were 
‘programmed’ to refrain from drawing inferences or taking action until we had complete, 
situation-specific data about each person or object we encountered, we would have died out long 
ago.  To function at all, we must design strategies for simplifying the perceptual environment and 
acting on less-than-perfect information.  A major way we accomplish both goals is by creating 
categories.”). 
 318. Id. (“Every person, and perhaps even every object that we encounter in the world, is 
unique, but to treat each as such would be disastrous.  Were we to perceive each object sui 
generis, we would rapidly be inundated by an unmanageable complexity that would quickly 
overwhelm our cognitive processing and storage capabilities.”). 
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placement of each letter on a keyboard before making the keystroke, typing 
would be grossly inefficient. 
Both the organizing of information and the filtering out of other 
information described above are often unconscious.  One of the unconscious 
ways that information is organized is through frames.319  Frames, as meanings 
and assumptions that “build up within [a] subject” and become internalized, 
“operate without conscious awareness.”320  These frames become invisible to 
us, just as “water is proverbially invisible to fish that swim in it.”321  A similar 
mechanism is described as ‘difference-networks.’322  The networks of 
associations, or implicit associations, in the mind can be gauged and observed, 
but only indirectly.323  These associations can be uncovered through speed tests 
that, for example, gauge our ability to read words like “beautiful” in concert 
with visual objects like a butterfly or tarantula.324 
In one such test, known as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), researchers 
asked test subjects to press a button when presented with a pleasant word or a 
different button when presented with an unpleasant word.325  Then, researchers 
presented words along with images of “European American” faces and 
“African American” faces.  Participants responded more slowly when 
European American faces appeared with unpleasant words than they did when 
European American faces appeared with pleasant words.326  Likewise, 
participants responded more slowly when African American faces paired with 
pleasant words than with unpleasant words.327  The researchers attributed this 
difference to the time it took the participants’ conscious minds to recover from 
the participants’ unconscious biases.328  The participants’ minds did not make 
the association, and so they actually interfered with the participants’ ability to 
process this information. 
The importance of implicit associations is not just that we have them, but 
that we make judgments on the basis of them.  The biases observed in studying 
 
 319. See supra text accompanying notes 252–57. 
 320. See Winter, supra note 78, at 1487. 
 321. Ogle, supra note 266, at 63. 
 322. MINSKY, supra note 281, at 200.  See also DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN 3 
(2007) (introducing the “network” concept). 
 323. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006).  Our conscious mind cannot directly observe 
them.  See id. at 952 (stating that people are not aware of their implicit biases and, in turn, their 
implicit associations). 
 324. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, supra note 315, 189–245. 
 325. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 323, at 952–53; see also Elise Porter, Note, The Player 
and the Dice: Physics and Critical Legal Theory, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1571 (1991) (critiquing 
implicit bias). 
 326. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 323, at 952–53. 
 327. Id. 
 328. See id. (treating the difference in response times as evidence of implicit bias). 
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these implicit beliefs, associations and preferences are referred to as “implicit 
biases.”329  What makes implicit attitudes so intriguing and troubling is that 
they often produce behavior that diverges from a person’s explicit beliefs or 
attitudes.330  The Implicit Association Test is a test that measures implicit 
bias.331  The speed of the responses registered by the keystrokes “allows an 
inference about attitudes . . . because it is easier to give the same response to 
items from two categories when those two categories are cognitively 
associated with each other.”332  The responses are more accurate and faster 
when closely associated categories are paired than when they are not paired.333  
For example, a person with negative implicit attitudes towards Blacks would 
be expected to go more quickly when “Black” and “bad” share one key, and 
“White” and “good” the other, than when the pairings of good and bad are 
switched.334 
We acquire these associations through cultural priming.335  Socially 
produced “tacit understandings” and “cultural stereotypes” become deposits in 
the unconscious.336  In short, children are socialized from an early age to 
understand race and its meanings in particular ways, and these understandings 
are so deeply ingrained that they are not always consciously experienced.337  
Information is not neutrally or objectively observed; information is rather 
filtered through the complex, mostly unconscious, associations we harbor.  Not 
only are many objects imbued with meaning or significance through our 
unconscious associations, but we are primed to observe some things and not 
others.338  Those things that we see tend to confirm or track our initial prime, 
 
 329. See, e.g., Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 427, 429 (2007).  Implicit bias is an aspect of social cognition science that has to do 
with these unconscious mental processes.  Social cognition is “a field concerned with the content 
and mechanisms of beliefs and preferences about oneself, other social beings, and social 
groups[.]”  Id. at 428.  Implicit social cognition is the body of research capturing discoveries 
about automatic, nonconscious, or implicit beliefs (stereotypes) and preferences (attitudes).  
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, 
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4–5 (1995).  Implicit attitudes are a separate construct 
from explicit attitudes.  Id. at 5. 
 330. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 329 at 15. 
 331. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 323, at 952; see also Porter, supra note 325, at 1571 
(critiquing implicit bias). 
 332. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 323, at 952. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See id. at 952–53. 
 335. Lawrence, supra note 121 at 323; but see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 323, at 960 
(critiquing the “cultural beliefs” interpretation of IAT results). 
 336. Lawrence, supra note 121, at 323. 
 337. See id. at 323, 338. 
 338. See Anders Kaye, Does Situationist Psychology Have Radical Implications for Criminal 
Responsibility?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 611, 637–38 (2008) (explaining “confirmation bias”). 
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and reject or forget information that challenges these associations.339  Both the 
organizing of information and the filtering out of other information in this way 
is very close to stereotyping.  Results from an implicit association test show 
that in this country, most people—whites as well as Latinos, blacks, and 
others—are more likely to misidentify a picture of a tool as a picture of a 
weapon when primed with a picture of a black face rather than one of a white 
face.340  This is because of the largely unconscious cultural associations 
regarding black men.341  Does that make us racist?  The answer is emphatically 
“no.”  It means that we harbor unconscious or implicit associations that 
become activated by the stimuli in our environment.  Malcolm Gladwell thinks 
that these processes may also explain the shooting of Amadou Diallo.342  As 
we said above, bias and stereotyping are not inherently pejorative; they are 
pervasive—even necessary—human characteristics.  Some of these biases are 
problematic and some are not.  But in each case, they affect our behavior.  This 
is very different from Newton or Descartes, who demand the objective 
perspective of the rational mind, which is no longer tenable.343 
Even beyond those unconscious processes that are directly observable 
through conscious effort and sometimes great difficulty, and those processes 
which are not directly observable, consciousness itself has been 
misconceived.344  Consciousness is not a unitary “thing.”345  According to 
Aaron Sloman, consciousness is actually a “very large collection of very 
different things.”346  Others, who reject the “thing” or “object” label, consider 
it a process.347 
 
 339. HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CHANGING OUR 
OWN AND OTHER PEOPLE’S MINDS (LEADERSHIP FOR THE COMMON GOOD) 47 (2006) (noting 
that information that does not ‘fit the frame’ is rejected). 
 340. B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI., 287, 287–88 (2006). 
 341. Id. at 288–89. 
 342. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, supra note 314, at 189–245 (attributing the shooting to a 
“mind reading failure” by the police rather than to conscious racism).  For more information on 
the Diallo shooting, see Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-
4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html. 
 343. See supra notes 40–54; see generally supra Part II.A.–B. 
 344. Consciousness has been classically called the ‘hard problem,’ and many attempts have 
been made to explain and understand it.  See David J. Chalmers, Facing up to the Problem of 
Consciousness, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 200, 200 (1995).  We do not attempt to advance an 
explanation here, although we note that there are promising possibilities, in particular the notion 
that consciousness may be a quantum state.  See Wendt, supra note 67, at 33. 
 345. See Chalmers, supra note 344, at 1. 
 346. MINSKY, supra note 281, at 107. 
 347. Wendt, supra note 67, at 33. 
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The unitary nature of consciousness is fostered by perception: 
[A]s soon as you enter a room, you have the sense that you instantly see 
everything that is in your view.  However, this is far from true: it is an illusion 
that comes because your eyes so quickly turn to focus upon whatever has 
attracted your attention.  Similarly, this also applies to consciousness, because 
we make the same sorts of mistakes about how much we can “see” inside our 
own minds.348 
In turn, the sense of a unitary perceptual field fosters the illusion of a 
single, unitary self.  The perception of a unified consciousness and a unified 
‘experience’ all aid in that illusion, often described as the “reflective” self.349  
According to traditional western views, this self is innate, located in space, 
“authentic,”350 and durable over time.351 
According to Professor Minsky, one of the key fairy tales exposed by the 
mind sciences is the “single-self concept.”352  While this idea may serve us 
well in day-to-day life, it hinders our ability to understand how our minds 
really work.353  According to Professor Minsky, the “self” is actually a facet of 
a “huge network of models,” constantly rotating, each of which tries to 
represent some particular aspect of the mind.354  In that way, we actually have 
multiple selves.355  It is not simply that these selves emerge when dealing with 
different issues; rather different selves emerge in different environments.356  
We are a different person with a spouse or significant other than we are with 
our boss or a parent.  Our selves are both contextual and relational.357 
The identity of the self as a rational being is also quite false.358  Emotions 
are not distinct from rationality or inferior ways of being.  On the contrary, 
emotional states are simply a certain way to think “that we use to increase our 
 
 348. MINSKY, supra note 281, at 107. 
 349. See generally SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 5–6.  Seigel argues that since Descartes and 
Locke, the Western ‘self’ has typically been constituted along one of three dimensions: bodily or 
material, the relational, and the reflective self.  See id. at 5.  The reflective self is most visible in 
the Cartesian cogito. 
 350. See MINSKY, supra note 281, at 300 (listing traits of the self). 
 351. But it should be noted that not all Enlightenment thinkers thought in this way.  David 
Hume is notable for his “bundle theory” of the self, which viewed the self as a series of intricate 
perceptions.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 350–51 (Philip Wheelwright ed., 
Doubleday, Doran, & Co., Inc., 1935) (1739); see also Harlan M. Goulett, God Hath Created the 
Mind Free: Toward a Jeffersonian Theory of Rights, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 1002 n.103 
(2004). 
 352. See MINSKY, supra note 281, at 14–15. 
 353. Id. at 14. 
 354. Id. at 16. 
 355. See generally powell, The Multiple Self, supra note 11. 
 356. See id. at 306. 
 357. See powell, The Multiple Self, supra note 11. 
 358. See supra Part I. 
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resourcefulness.”359  Emotions are not separate from thinking; they are a 
product of thinking.360  The Enlightenment conception of the mind—the 
consciousness of the rational, unitary self—is no longer tenable. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE PRACTICE, 
TEACHING AND THEORY OF LAW 
The intellectual struggle that produced the scientific revolution led to the 
Enlightenment, which borrowed its methodology, grammar, and habits of 
thought and practice.  As demonstrated in Part II, American jurisprudence, 
across the spectrum of public and private law, despite evolving conceptions of 
justice and radical shifts in constitutional meaning, remains grounded in the 
methods, principles, and precepts of Enlightenment philosophy.  Yet, these 
philosophical assumptions and scientific concepts have been undermined by 
recent developments in the very disciplines in which they originated.  In this 
part of the essay, we take seriously the insights of relativity, quantum physics, 
systems science, and the mind sciences described in Part II, and confront the 
ramifications of these developments for our practice and conceptions of law. 
In challenging the assumptions associated with the umpire metaphor, we 
argue that the judicial role is far more interactive than the metaphor suggests.  
We call into question the assumptions of an intrinsic severability of the judge 
and the law, of the law and society, and of rules and their application.  At the 
same time, we raise doubts about the neutrality and objectivity of the judicial 
perspective or of law itself, and the certainty that such a perspective may 
entail. 
If, as quantum theory suggests, the subject and object are not intrinsically 
separable, if we are not separate from the world in the way that classical 
science assumed, then judges and jurists are not separate from cases they 
adjudicate.  They are not separate from the law they announce or purport to 
interpret, the facts they deem relevant, or the players they identify as parties.  
Judges do more than merely call the game, they constitute the game itself. 
The power to settle rules for calling the game entails the power to prescribe 
what constitutes a relevant fact, meaning, both legal and factual, and who 
counts as a player.361  Different epistemic practices and assumptions regarding 
those practices determines what is required for different sorts of knowledge.  
Judges, and Justices in particular, play a critical role in deciding meta-level 
questions that affect what counts as knowledge by providing analytical 
 
 359. MINSKY, supra note 281, at 6. 
 360. Id. at 18 (“[T]his book . . . think[s] of each mental condition [generally considered an 
emotion] as based on the use of many small [mental] processes.”). 
 361. The selection or description of facts itself is a constitutive act. 
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frameworks,362 standing limits, and evidentiary requirements.  These “rules” of 
the game critically affect outcomes. 
In a trio of far-reaching racial justice cases, Bakke,363 Milliken,364 and 
McClesky,365 the issue of what counts as knowledge is decisive.  These cases 
are decided at the epistemic level.  In each case, the Court sharply 
circumscribes what it is willing to credit as relevant knowledge.  By imposing 
such limits, it constitutes the rules of the game.  And in each case, the 
limitations of what counts as relevant knowledge is determined with a clear 
concern over potential remedies.  There is an implicit cost/benefit balancing—
that what counts as sufficient causal evidence may depend upon the remedy 
being sought. 
In Bakke, petitioners sought to justify the use of race-conscious admissions 
criteria on several grounds, including the ground of “countering the effects of 
societal discrimination.”366  Justice Powell rejected this justification, saying 
that it was too “amorphous [a] concept of injury.”367  Justice Powell did not 
deny the existence of societal discrimination against racially and ethnically 
marginalized groups, or the undue advantages that have accrued to the racial 
majority as a result.368  Rather, the problem was causation.  Using the “but-for” 
test, Justice Powell suggests that “but for this discrimination by society at 
large, Bakke ‘would have failed to qualify for admission’” is a “speculative 
leap.”369 
Justice Powell claims that “[n]ot one word in the record supports” the 
conclusion that societal discrimination was a “but-for” cause of the inability of 
minorities to qualify for admission.370  Yet, much of this record that Justice 
Powell dismisses demonstrated how societal discrimination disadvantaged 
 
 362. Notable examples of judicially provided frameworks which have a severe impact upon 
outcomes are the “strict scrutiny” framework common to the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence, and United States v. Carolene Products, Co.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must 
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’  This means that such classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”) 
(citation omitted); United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 152 n.4 (1937) 
(abandoning strict scrutiny of economic regulation, and instead applying rationale basis, but 
reserving strict scrutiny for infringements of certain rights in the famous footnote 4). 
 363. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 364. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 365. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 366. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion). 
 367. Id. at 307. 
 368. See id. at 296 n.36 (“No one denies the regrettable fact that there has been societal 
discrimination in this country against various racial and ethnic groups.”). 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  Id. 
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potential minority candidates, a fact he acknowledged.371  Petitioners 
established that societal discrimination made it more difficult for minorities to 
qualify for admission and that societal discrimination made it more likely that 
Bakke would be rejected.  Yet Justice Powell does not explain why this 
showing is insufficient to establish a causal link between societal 
discrimination and Bakke’s rejection.372 
Justice Powell’s standard in Bakke for what may count as a ‘cause’—but-
for causation—is a high bar for knowledge of causation, and inconsistent with 
modern science.  Justice Powell does not explicitly explain his standard of 
causation and why he is unwilling to credit causal forces that do not rise to the 
level of a but-for cause.  But Justice Powell raises two prudential concerns that 
appear to bear on his evidentiary standards.373  First, he is concerned that such 
a program would unfairly disadvantage individuals like Bakke who “bear no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions 
program are thought to have suffered.”374  In doing so, Powell is engaging in 
“methodological individualism,” a reductionist approach to justice.375  Second, 
he is concerned that without such a showing of causation, the potential remedy 
would lack clear limits.376  The scope of the remedy, it is thought, must be 
tethered to the degree of responsibility.  That idea is also present in Milliken v 
Bradley.377 
In Milliken, the issue was whether a metropolitan-wide remedy is legally 
permissible to redress de jure segregation within the Detroit school system.378  
In reasoning against a metropolitan-wide remedy, consider Justice Potter 
Stewart’s opinion: 
 
 371. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362, 370–71. 
 372. See id. at 296 n.36. 
 373. For a critique of Justice Powell’s causal reasoning, see generally Goodwin Liu, The 
Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
1045 (2002). 
 374. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310. 
 375. See CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 130–34 (1995).  Joseph 
Schumpeter is attributed with coining this term.  See id. at 300–02. 
 376. “To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of 
legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure 
to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination.”  Id.  Further, 
“[Petitioners] offer no standard for courts to use in applying such a presumption of causation . . . .  
This failure is a grave one, since if it may be concluded on this record that each of the minority 
groups preferred by the petitioner’s special program is entitled to the benefit of the presumption, 
it would seem difficult to determine that . . . the dozens of minority groups that have suffered 
‘societal discrimination’ cannot also claim it, in any area of social intercourse.”  Id. at 296 n.36 
(citation omitted). 
 377. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 378. Id. at 721 (plurality opinion). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1086 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1035 
It is this essential fact of a predominantly Negro school population in Detroit—
caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such as in-migration, 
birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of private racial fears—that 
accounts for the ‘growing core of Negro schools,’ a ‘core’ that has grown to 
include virtually the entire city.379 
Justice Stewart acknowledges that blacks are heavily segregated in the 
Detroit area, but the cause?  For him, it’s unknown, though not for want of 
explanations.380  He lists a number of contributory factors, and his brethren list 
many.381  Moreover, Justice Stewart not only said that these factors were 
unknown, but that they were perhaps unknowable.382  And because we cannot 
know, and not simply that we do not know, no remedy can be enforced.  
Justice Stewert is thus unwilling to impose a metropolitan-wide desegregation 
plan involving many districts without a more detailed, perhaps impossible, 
showing that they were directly responsible for the Detroit school district’s 
racial isolation.  What Justice Stewart is really arguing is what counts as 
acceptable knowledge.  Information that does not adhere to the way in which 
“causation” is typically understood in the law, as but-for or proximate 
causation, is insufficient.383  Some things are knowable because they adhere to 
the way we think of knowledge from a Newtonian perspective, while other 
information is not. 
In law, the two predominant forms of causality are cause-in-fact, or but-for 
causation, and legal causation, known as proximate cause.  Cause-in-fact is a 
necessary conditionality.384  The antecedent must have occurred in order that 
 
 379. Id. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting): 
The creation of the school districts in Metropolitan Detroit either maintained existing 
segregation or caused additional segregation.  Restrictive covenants maintained by state 
action or inaction build black ghettos.  It is state action when public funds are dispensed 
by housing agencies to build racial ghettos.  Where a community is racially mixed and 
school authorities segregate schools, or assign black teachers to black schools or close 
schools in fringe areas and build new schools in black areas and in more distant white 
areas, the State creates and nurtures a segregated school system, just as did those States 
involved in Brown v. Board of Education . . . when they maintained dual school 
systems. . . .  All these conditions and more were found by the District Court to exist. 
Id. at 761.  Justice Marshall noted that the effects of residential segregation, coupled with the 
conscious actions of the school board, were also factors that contributed to an expanding core of 
all black schools surrounding by a band of all white schools.  Id. at 716–17 (plurality opinion). 
 382. Id. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 383. It is one thing to say that the cause of racial segregation in Detroit is unknown; it is 
another to say that it is perhaps unknowable.  As excerpted above, Justice Stewart made reference 
to a few contributory factors that could produce such an outcome, suggesting that these factors 
are neither unknown nor unknowable. 
 384. Allan Beever, Cause in Fact: Two Steps out of the Mire, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 327, 330 
(2001). 
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the consequence might follow.  Propositional logic and formal logic make 
great use of both sufficient and necessary conditionality, which are causal 
statements.385  In fact, however, there are many causes of outcomes that are 
neither sufficient nor necessary.386  Outcomes produced by complex systems 
are rarely the product of sufficient causes.387  And to the extent that necessary 
causes are present, they are often trivial from an analytical perspective.388  
Rather, outcomes in complex systems are produced by contributory causes.389  
A contributory cause is any cause, no matter how remote, that ultimately helps 
produce an outcome.390  It does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary 
condition.  In Milliken, the record demonstrated that the proliferation of 
suburban districts contributed to Detroit’s segregative trends.391  Nonetheless, 
in terms of imposing a metropolitan-wide remedy, the Court is unwilling to 
credit this evidence.392  A similar unwillingness leads to grim results in 
McCleskey. 
In McCleskey, an African American defendant challenged his death 
sentenced based on detailed sociological evidence demonstrating that juries 
were harsher to African American defendants, especially when the alleged 
victim was white.393  The Court in McCleskey found that, although the 
 
 385. Note that statements of conditionality are not always causal statements.  It is generally 
accepted that causal statements require that cause precedes effect in time, but conditional 
statements do not.  Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting 
“Junk Logic” About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 381, 432 (2004). 
 386. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of 
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 498–99 (2006).  Katz uses the term 
“minimal causation,” to describe causes that help produce outcomes but are neither necessary nor 
sufficient.  Id. at 499.  We use the term ‘contributory’ causes to describe all causes, whether 
necessary, sufficient or both.  But a contributory cause also encompasses Katz’s notion of 
‘minimal’ causes. 
 387. See generally Chauncee D. Smith, Note, Deconstructing the Pipeline: Evaluating 
School-to-Prison Pipeline Equal Protection Cases Through a Structural Racism Framework, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1024 (2009).  For example, there is no single factor that can produce 
an economic depression or a hurricane.  These outcomes are the product of many causes 
interacting.  If sufficient causes were present, then a complex systems perspective would not be 
necessary. 
 388. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 386, at 498 (analogizing necessary, but not sufficient, causes 
to the straw that broke the camel’s back).  For example, while global warming is a product of 
many causes, the presence of a globe to warm is a necessary condition to that outcome.  This 
necessary cause is analytically insignificant because it is a given. 
 389. See Smith, supra note 387, at 1024 (“[T]he dynamic nature of [complex systems] . . . . 
occur as a result of multiple causes.”). 
 390. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (8th ed. 1999) (defining “contributing cause” as “[a] 
factor that—though not the primary cause—plays a part in producing a result”). 
 391. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1973). 
 392. See id. at 752. 
 393. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987). 
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statistical evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that discrimination existed 
in the Georgia criminal system, there was no evidence of intentional 
discrimination against McCleskey.394  The Court found the idea of state 
responsibility for a discriminatory system unconvincing, stating that the 
defendant “appears to argue that the State has violated the Equal Protection 
Clause by adopting the capital punishment statute and allowing it to remain in 
force despite its allegedly discriminatory application.”395  Without evidence of 
intentional discrimination, the Court held, 
As legislatures necessarily have wide discretion in the choice of criminal laws 
and penalties, and as there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature 
to adopt and maintain capital punishment . . . we will not infer a discriminatory 
purpose on the part of the State of Georgia. Accordingly, we reject 
McCleskey’s equal protection claims.396 
Again, the Court is fashioning the rules of the game by defining what counts as 
knowledge.397  And, once again, it appears that the Court is constraining what 
it will count as knowledge based, at least in part, upon a concern with the 
potential remedy.  In another example of methodological individualism and its 
reductionist logic, examination of McCleskey’s case is atomized to the point 
where it obscures the government’s responsibility—based on its acts and 
omissions—for racially disparate effects of the criminal justice system.398  This 
has the result of enabling particular instances of discrimination, which can be 
explained in racially neutral terms, to be dismissed in isolation.  Just as the 
Court ignored the numerous “unknown and unknowable” causes of residential 
segregation in Milliken, the Court in McCleskey turns a blind eye to the 
obvious and well documented history (and present state of) discrimination in 
Georgia’s criminal justice system, in part, for what Justice Brennan famously 
called “a fear of too much justice.”399  One scholar compared the Court’s claim 
 
 394. Specifically, the court said “to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey 
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.  He offers no 
evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations 
played a part in his sentence.”  Id. at 292–93. 
 395. Id. at 297–98. 
 396. Id. at 298–99. 
 397. The intent doctrine created by the Court in Washington v. Davis is extremely 
problematic when considering the mind sciences and implicit bias.  See generally Krieger, 
Content of Our Categories, supra note 212; see also Lawrence, supra note 121. 
 398. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:  Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988). 
 399. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Brennan responded to the part of the majority 
opinion that stated that, besides the ‘lack’ of intentional discrimination on the part of the state, if 
the court were to recognize the overwhelming statistical evidence of discrimination, it “could 
soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.”  Id. at 315. 
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that the Baldus study only shows ‘correlation,’ rather than sufficient causation, 
to the tobacco companies’ claims that cigarettes may not cause cancer.400 
The epistemic practices the Court employed in Bakke, Milliken, and 
McClesky are quite limiting.  The standards for what counts as relevant 
knowledge prove decisive.  The Court is acting like the atmosphere, filtering 
out all but one wavelength, so it “sees” only blue.  Although some legal 
scholars have called this “Newtonian judicial blindness,’401 the use of the law 
in this way turns out to be an epistemic practice of ignorance.  The “cognitive 
norms that produce ignorance as an effect of substantive epistemic practices 
are those that naturalize and dehistoricize both the process and product of 
knowing.”402  Thus, Justice Brown in Plessy said that if the separation of races 
by rail carriages denotes inferiority, it is solely because “the colored race 
chooses to put that construction upon it.”403  That is more than a neglectful or 
inaccurate epistemic practice; it’s a practice of ignorance.  It uses the 
formalism of law to make certain facts irrelevant or even unintelligible.404  For 
example, in Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts did not even address the 
considerably and impressive body of social science evidence gathered in 
support of a compelling government interest in diversity.405  He said that this 
evidence was irrelevant because the plans at issue were not narrowly 
tailored.406  The narrow-tailoring requirements, a feature of the strict scrutiny 
framework, serve to preclude consideration of the merits of the issue in Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion.407  Thus, in each of these cases, the Justices are not 
simply failing to credit certain forms of knowledge, but in fact they are 
determining what counts as knowledge—they are fashioning the rules of the 
game.  They are much more than mere referees.  They are determining the 
 
 400. Kennedy, supra note 398, at 1415–16. 
 401. Tribe, supra note 19, at 34. 
 402. Linda Martin Alcoff, Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types, in RACE AND 
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE 39, 39 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007).  Note 
this is not merely a lack of knowledge, but it is active and deliberate ignorance and repression. 
 403. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).  The full quotation reads: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority.   If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. 
Id. 
 404. This is a very important distinction.  As we have seen, some facts are made irrelevant, 
such as the migration patterns of persons in metro Detroit.  Others are made unintelligible, as seen 
in the Court’s attempt in McClesky to identify which forms of intentional discrimination are 
entitled to a remedy. 
 405. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725–26 (2007). 
 406. Id. 
 407. The tiered scrutiny framework readily lends itself to judicial determinations regarding 
what counts as relevant knowledge. 
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strike zone.  In that way, while claiming to be neutral, predictable, and 
objective, formalism in the law can serve quite pernicious ends.408 
The umpire analogy projects a method of adjudication in two distinct steps.  
First, the law has to be known or discovered.  Depending on the 
methodological approach, this step usually begins with an inspection of 
relevant text or precedent.  Second, this meaning has to be applied to the facts 
at hand.  What is important for our immediate purposes is that the step of rule 
determination and rule application are assumed to be distinct.  Challenging the 
Enlightenment assumption of objectivity, and therefore neutrality, we suggest 
that the attempt to separate the subject and object, the observer and the 
observed, the judge and the law, is not possible.409  That also means that the 
assumption that rule determination and rule application is distinct must also be 
called into question.  There is a unity between interpretation and application.  
The concerns with the remedies in Bakke, Millikin, and McClesky in 
determining the prior question of what counts as knowledge illustrates the 
relationship between the two steps. 
The umpire analogy further assumes that judges can objectively observe 
both the law and the facts.  The first step, determining textual meaning, is the 
“objective” turn, to read a text and understand its import and significance.  
Originalists seek to do this by looking at how the text was originally 
understood.410  Textualists do this by restricting the possible range of textual 
interpretations through reference only to the language of the document itself.411 
The desire to discover objective textual meaning is an Enlightenment 
legacy.  The concern is that so long as subjectivity is present, objectivity 
cannot be.  And, under Enlightenment epistemology, meaning resulting from 
subjectivity is unsecure in its legitimacy.  Methodology, no matter how 
refined, cannot resolve this insecurity.412  In our attempt to understand 
something, we cannot help but bring to bear certain “interpretative 
possibilities” which are a product of our prior experience.413  The possibilities 
are thereby conditioned by meanings provided in the past.414  The meaning of a 
 
 408. See generally Porter supra note 330 at 1571. 
 409. See Gedicks, supra note 70, at 625–29.  Heidegger suggests that subject and object are 
always inseparably intertwined in relationships.  Id. at 644.  This is consistent with quantum 
theory and systems thinking. Quantum theory suggests that the process of observation alters the 
thing being observed, as well as the observer.  Tribe, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
 410. Gedicks, supra note 70, at 634. 
 411. Jonathan R. Seigel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory 
Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309, 319 (2001). 
 412. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD at xx-xxi (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall trans., Continuum 2004) (1975). 
 413. See Gedicks, supra note 70, at 626; see also GADAMER, supra note 412, at 300; see also 
infra Part IV (discussing the mind sciences). 
 414. See Gedicks, supra note 70, at 626. 
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text is “always already shaped by the tradition in which it is embedded—those 
situations in which the text has previously been applied.”415  It may appear that 
this is consistent with the originalist approach, which uses prior interpretation 
to govern present questions.  The shift from Plessy to Brown belies such a 
conclusion.  Neither the text of the Equal Protection Clause nor the facts of the 
cases changed.  What changed was the meaning attributed to the text and the 
facts.416  Prior understanding of the text was viewed in light of the issue at 
hand in a “fusion of horizons.”417  Thus, the “meaning of the constitutional text 
is . . . neither merely what the Framers and their contemporaries understood it 
to mean, nor merely what we in the present understand it to mean, but both.”418 
The first assumption embedded in the umpire analogy is the assumption of 
neutrality.  As we noted in Part I, an essential ingredient of the Enlightenment 
Project was the assumption of neutrality.  This assumption was derived from 
the science that preceded it, and the belief that there was a neutral stance, and 
an objective world.419  The idea is that, in terms of observing the world (or the 
mind) through reason, we want to be neutral, dispassionate, and disinterested, 
keeping our emotions in check.420  In that sense, neutrality became a goal of 
science.  This assumption is deeply grounded in our jurisprudence.  We seek 
neutrality in our law and demand it from our judges. 
In the confirmation hearings for Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the issue was 
raised whether jurists are neutral, or can be neutral.  Many of the questions 
posed to Sotomayor during her confirmation process questioned her 
impartiality—her ability to render justice neutrally.421  Exhibit A, calling into 
 
 415. Id. at 627. 
 416. Justice Souter made this challenge to originalism in his remarks at the 2010 Harvard 
commencement ceremonies: 
The meaning of facts arises elsewhere, and its judicial perception turns on the experience 
of the judges, and on their ability to think from a point of view different from their own.  
Meaning comes from the capacity to see what is not in some simple, objective sense there 
on the printed page.  And when the judges in 1954 read the record of enforced segregation 
it carried only one possible meaning: It expressed a judgment of inherent inferiority on the 
part of the minority race.  The judges who understood the meaning that was apparent in 
1954 would have violated their oaths to uphold the Constitution if they had not held the 
segregation mandate unconstitutional. 
Justice David Souter, Commencement Remarks at Harvard University (May 27, 2010), available 
at http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/ [hereinafter 
Souter, Commencement Remarks]. 
 417. GADAMER, supra note 412, at 367. 
 418. See Gedicks, supra note 70, at 635. 
 419. See supra Part I. 
 420. This capacity, in turn, depends upon the inherent severability of emotions and other 
cognitive processes.  See supra Part III.D. 
 421. See generally Transcript—Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, Day 2, N.Y. TIMES.COM, 
July 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/politics/14confirm-text.html?pagewanted 
=all. 
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question her neutrality, was her 2001 statement, “I would hope that a wise 
Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not 
reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”422  If 
the life experiences of a Latina woman influence the decision-making process, 
if not the outcomes themselves, then does that call into question Justice 
Sotomayor’s ability to render objective judgments of law?  Moreover, if life 
experience matters in general, then does that call into question whether 
neutrality is possible at all? 
What we have seen in both the physical sciences and in the more recent 
mind sciences is that the idea of neutrality from the Newtonian perspective is 
not possible.  Our observation of the world—our experience—is never neutral.  
And yet, this idea, that sensory experience is both fixed (objective) and neutral 
is one of the most enduring ideas of both seventeenth century science and the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment Project.  The possibility of an objective 
perspective is similarly unattainable.  The act of seeing, of observing, is 
simultaneously an act of perceiving, of constructing knowledge, including the 
self.  Roberts’ position that he merely ‘calls it like he sees’ it assumes that 
observation is a neutral, passive process, and not an active one that is 
constructing the experience itself.  The research in the mind sciences described 
in Part III.C substantiates these insights and describes these processes.423 
We demand neutrality, not merely in our judges, but in the law as well.  It 
was in these terms that Herbert Wechsler launched one of the most searing 
critiques of Brown.  Wechsler argued that Brown was illegitimate because it 
was not decided on the basis of neutral principles.424  Consequently, 
Wechsler’s critique was used by Southerners to justify resistance to the Brown 
mandate.425  Wechsler argued that the interest of whites, who wished to avoid 
association with blacks and students of color, could not be neutrally reconciled 
against the interests of blacks, who expressed an interest in integration.426  
There were two interests and two rights of association being implicated.  The 
issue for Wechsler was how the Court might neutrally decide which to 
support.427  Siding with the black students was, in some abstract sense, a 
violation of neutral principles.428  The influence of this debate on 
 
 422. See Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87 (2002). 
 423. See supra Part III.C. 
 424. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 26 (1959). 
 425. See Reva Siegel, Equality Talks: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1495 (2004). 
 426. Wechsler, supra note 424, at 34. 
 427. See id. 
 428. Goodwin Liu has shown that Plessy also presumed neutrality.  See Goodwin Liu, 
“History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 53, 65 n.75 (2008). 
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contemporary interpretation of the equal protection clause and the meaning of 
the Brown decision is evident.429 
In contemporary equal protection jurisprudence, particularly on the 
Roberts’ court, the trappings of neutrality are very strong.430  The 
anticlassification principle has been adopted recently by a majority of the 
Court as the test for applying the equal protection clause.431  This principle 
suggests that Linda Brown and Parents Involved plaintiff Joshua McDonald 
were subjected to the same harm: the harm of racial classification.432  In turn, 
Brown has been reinterpreted as a case of impermissible racial classification 
rather than the judicial condemnation of a caste system of racial subordination.  
This new reading is ultimately derivative of Wechsler and the idea that the 
jurists and the law should be neutral.  Consequently, equal protection 
jurisprudence is in large measure derivative of Newtonian neutral principles.433 
Not only is neutrality not possible, it is not something to which we should 
aspire.  The Declaration of Independence is not neutral.  The Constitution is 
not a neutral document.  Equality is not a neutral concept.  These documents 
and the ideas they express are grounded in values and intended to achieve often 
partisan ends.  What Wechsler noticed, but left unstated, was that to transform 
the societal arrangement and secure the rights of blacks, you have to impact 
those arrangements for whites.  Wechsler was obliquely recognizing that rights 
are relational.  In spite of this, he tried, as does the anticlassification advocate, 
to develop jurisprudence that is not relational.  It is not possible.434  This is not 
only true of Jim Crow or contemporary racial arrangements, but it is also true 
of contract law, property law, and so on.435  Insistent on an Enlightenment 
paradigm, there has been much effort devoted to developing an approach to 
avoid this claim or to misunderstand it.  Granted, a relational jurisprudence 
will make law less than neutral, even political.436  It is this that triggers a new 
Cartesian anxiety.  If the law is not neutral or objective, then it follows that it 
must be farce and chaos.  Once we reject the idea of neutrality as a goal, the 
 
 429. See Siegel, supra note 425, at 1547. 
 430. See john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Little Rock and the Legacy of Dred Scott, 52 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1178 (2008). 
 431. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 (2007); 
see also john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Parents Involved: The Mantle of Brown, the 
Shadow of Plessy, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631, 684 (2008). 
 432. Id. 
 433. See Siegel, supra note 425, at 1472.  The rejection of Newtonian neutrality and 
objectivity does not entail chaos, but it requires a different understanding of both.  See generally 
BERNSTEIN supra note 45. 
 434. GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE 
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 24–25 (1998). 
 435. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986). 
 436. See Winter, supra note 78, 1450. 
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issue shifts focus to address which values are being served, how do we think 
about those values, and how are they to be effectuated?  Those are very 
different questions than those posed by a claim of neutrality.437 
The power to settle rules for calling the game entails the power to prescribe 
what constitutes a fact and who counts as a player.  In turn, judicial 
responsibility is much greater and more profound than simply observing and 
calling balls or strikes, or pretending to respond to the natural world.  If we 
reject the idea that there is a “natural” world that we can know, then we 
necessarily do more than respond to it or observe it.  We interact with it, co-
creating it through our interaction.  In turn, the world is co-creating us.  Law 
acts as a context for society, and society is a context for law.438  As a context 
for each other, they interact and evolve together, in mutual co-constitution.439 
Contrary to the assumption that law and society are intrinsically separable, 
there is a powerful reciprocal interaction between law and society.  Judgments 
of law warp the epistemological space in which society moves.440  “Each legal 
decision restructures the law itself, as well as the social setting in which law 
operates.”441  The meaning of the issues at stake may change as soon as an 
issue is adjudicated.  The very act of adjudication, particularly by the Supreme 
Court, transmutes the importance of the issues at stake.442 
 
 437. One could argue that a fundamental societal and legal value is fairness.  However, while 
equality and fairness are often conflated, in practice they are very different concepts.  See Kent 
Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1983). 
 438. See Ruhl, supra note 192, at 851. 
 439. Id.; see Winter, supra note 78, at 1452, 1475. 
 440. Tribe, supra note 19, at 22. 
 441. Id. at 8.  Professor Tribe observes that law has a “pervasive and profound” role in 
shaping our society and our lives.  Id. at 2.  The relationship between law and society is a 
dialectical one.  Tribe uses the analogy of ‘curved’ space propounded by Einstein to critique 
worldview that understands state power, including judicial power, as neutral or apart from 
society.  Id. at 7–8.  More deeply, Professor Tribe suggests that state action, even when not 
directed at a particular individual, shapes the rules of the game in a way that can interact with 
private decisions to produce harmful outcomes.  See id. at 8–11.  But courts sometimes have 
difficulty recognizing as much.  The contributory causation of law thus goes unnoticed by judges.  
See, e.g., id. at 15–16 (discussing cases where the Court ignores contributory causation by 
defining the “natural” social order). 
 442. Professor Tribe discusses the case of Wooley v. Maynard, a case in which two Jehovah’s 
witnesses objected, on First Amendment grounds, to being forced to display the state motto, 
“Live Free or Die,” on their license plate.  Id. at 20–21 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 
(1977)).  Passing on the symbolic speech issue—in which the Maynards requested a license plate 
with no motto—the Court focused instead on the right to speak or to not speak, ruling that a state 
may not force individuals to publicly display its message on their private property.  Id. at 21.  
Tribe makes the brilliant point that the very meaning of the decision changes as a result of this 
decision.  Id. at 23.  After all, not displaying the motto becomes conspicuous, and, thereby, a 
message in itself.  Id. at 22.  Before the Court’s decision—or perhaps before the case was brought 
to court—the Maynards’s display of a plate without the motto would not necessarily be speech in 
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The Court frames and often heightens the meaning of the issues, as private 
conflicts acquire political significance.  For example, Dred Scott was a simple 
lawsuit for freedom that became a national concern.  Conversely, the public 
response to a judicial decision can in turn shape the meaning of those 
decisions.  The debate over neutral principles and the massive resistance to 
Brown shaped Brown’s future.443  At the same time, even though the 
enunciation of rights in Brown did not bring about the change the legal team 
had hoped, it did change the national discourse and gave moral legitimacy to 
the Civil Rights movement.444  “An adequate constitutional analysis cannot 
ignore the impact on social meaning of the Court’s own action.”445  Nor can 
such an analysis ignore the legal impact of the societal response. 
[W]hen the Court observes and describes legal phenomena . . . we sense, 
among other things, that it is not simply taking measurements and making a 
record of something that is already ‘out there.’  Rather, it is bending and 
changing the legal and social landscape so that, after such cases are decided, 
people will be guided by assumptions and premises and patterns that differ 
from those that shaped their behavior before those cases were decided.446 
For example, the expectation that school boards, rather than state or 
municipalities, would be the remedial agent in desegregation cases later 
affected the perceived utility of judicial efforts to stem white flight.  In that 
sense, Milliken is an outgrowth of prior decisions, which have been taken as a 
given and naturalized.  At the same time, Milliken sanctioned white flight by 
shielding suburban districts from the Brown mandate.  In doing so, it altered 
the “gravitational pull,” which was not to accept racial integration, but to resist 
it.  The Court’s decision in Milliken legitimated minority ghettoization by 
failing to recognize the role of law and state action in creating that situation, 
and making it more likely that people will think nothing is wrong.447 
 
and of itself.  After the Court ruled on the case, the Maynards—who originally sought to present 
no speech at all on their plate, were in fact forced into symbolic speech by the decision, which 
said that they must cover or not cover the plate, each action sending a message.  Id. 
 443. See generally Siegel, supra note 425 (discussing early resistance to Brown and how 
those arguments shaped the development of equal protection law). 
 444. Professor Tribe points out that the direct force of Brown was anemic and less than two 
percent of southern schools were desegregated.  Tribe, supra note 19, at 29.  However, the 
declaration of rights in Brown transformed the political reality.  Id.  “[T]his declaration of rights 
had in itself dramatically altered the country’s perspective as to which group had law and order 
on its side.  During the Montgomery bus boycotts and throughout the civil rights movement, 
Brown put the force of legal morality behind the demonstrators.”  Id.  This helped fuel the 
political discontent and propel passage of civil rights legislation.  Id. 
 445. Id. at 22. 
 446. Id. at 23. 
 447. Tribe, supra note 19, at at 30. 
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Similarly, the ramifications of judicial tinkering with the rules of the game 
in cases like Bakke or McClesky shape societal expectations in other ways.  
Randall Kennedy criticized McClesky on the grounds that, in fashioning a 
decision that flows backward from the consequences of the remedy, the Court 
actually distorts and warps the legal landscape to justify its decision:448 
The Court itself suggested that McCleskey should have taken his complaint to 
legislative bodies, not the federal courts.  But by allowing concerns over 
remedy to determine its assessment of the social reality at issue, the Court’s 
opinion miseducates the executives, legislators, constituents, and other 
possible participants in the controversy.  By suggesting that there exists no real 
racial problem in Georgia’s administration of the death penalty, the Court 
makes discussion of any remedy far more difficult: in the wake of McCleskey, 
those seeking reform must attempt to change a popular but unfairly 
administered institution on the basis, in part, of racial disparities the Supreme 
Court of the United States appears to have found completely untroubling.449 
Legal formalism is not the only practice of epistemological ignorance.  The 
construction of text, the metaphysics of the Enlightenment itself, helps to usher 
in these practices.  Consider the discrimination model under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  It is deeply grounded in “methodological individualism.”450  
This is a form of reductionism, where the focus is the individual.  As Chief 
Justice Roberts reiterated, “[T]he Equal Protection Clause ‘protect[s] persons, 
not groups.’”451 
But it is not just individuals; there is a focus on the individual’s state of 
mind.  While it may be true that we are individuals, none of us are just an 
individual—the individual is always embedded.452  The question is posed: 
What did the individual intend to do?  It is this information that tells us 
whether we have discrimination.  We are looking for bad actors that 
consciously have animus toward some group or person and then act on it.453  It 
is assumed that it was the intent that caused the outcome.  Outcomes that 
appear discriminatory or have been caused because of the person’s race are not 
considered discrimination when they lack this intentionality.  In a sense, it falls 
 
 448. Kennedy, supra note 398, at 1416. 
 449. Id. 
 450. See TAYLOR, supra note 375, at 133–34. 
 451. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007) 
(quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).  “Liberal social and political 
theories and theories of scientific knowledge alike owe much to the idea that the world is 
composed of individuals—presumed to exist before the law, or the discovery of the law.”  
BARAD, supra note 12, at 46. 
 452. Winter, supra note 78, at 1531. 
 453. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (explaining that a finding of 
discrimination requires an express or implied discriminatory purpose).  Title VII has been 
similarly interpreted.  See Krieger, Content of our Categories, supra note 212, at 1168. 
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back to Justices Stewart’s and Powell’s positions that something may be going 
on, though it is not known to a sufficient legal standard, and it is perhaps 
unknowable. 
In addition to neutrality, objectivity, and certainty, the conception of the 
natural state or natural position embedded within Enlightenment thought has 
wound its way into law.  Nineteenth century jurists, often educated in the 
philosophy of natural law, expressed this idea in several ways.  First, jurists 
would justify certain arrangements in society on the basis of the ‘naturalness’ 
of them.  Perhaps most infamously is Plessy v. Ferguson,454 where the Court 
acquiesces to the “natural” social division and social inferiority of blacks in 
relationship to whites.455  As Justice Brown said on behalf of the Court, “If one 
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States 
cannot put them upon the same plane.”456  But it is not just that the social order 
is impermeable by law, because it is imprudent to attempt to do so.457  There is 
an underlying view that there is a limit to law’s reach, and that limit is nature: 
[Plaintiff’s] argument . . . assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by 
legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an 
enforced commingling of the two races.  We cannot accept this proposition.  If 
the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of 
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary 
consent of individuals . . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial 
instincts.458 
If we go back further still, we find the same approach in Dred Scott v. 
Sanford,459 where Chief Justice Taney catalogued the history of race relations 
in law as well as social relations as justification for denying blacks citizenship.  
In view of the Chief Justice, speaking on behalf of the Court: 
[These laws and customs] show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was 
intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had 
reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, 
and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created 
beings, that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or mulattoes 
were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in 
the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage.460 
 
 454. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 455. Id. at 551. 
 456. Id. at 552. 
 457. Justice Brown cites People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883), which says that this 
end cannot be accomplished or promoted by laws which conflict with the community upon whom 
they are designed to operate.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
 458. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). 
 459. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 460. Id. at 409. 
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In short, the Chief Justice sketched a natural order, a “scale of being,” or chain, 
and a conflation of natural with morality.  He continued, 
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior 
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or 
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white 
man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be 
reduced to slavery for his benefit.  He was bought and sold, and treated as an 
ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made 
by it.  This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion 
of the white race.  It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, 
which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men 
in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their 
private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a 
moment the correctness of this opinion.461 
Chief Justice Taney’s conclusion was grounded in his inspection of the laws 
and constitutions of the states, the colonies, and Great Britain, as well as the 
custom of the time.462  In its cataloging of the laws of the time, the Court acted 
as if it was just “observing” nature, as if the Court was a scientist investigating 
a particular phenomenon, empirical in its methodology, and basing its 
adjudication on nothing more than the facts.463  In doing so, the Court was 
either denying or unaware of its role in creating these norms, of building them 
into not only the Constitution, but the fabric of the nation. 
Even if ‘natural position’ reasoning no longer explicitly drives the Court’s 
race equality jurisprudence, it persisted longer in other areas, especially gay 
rights.  In terms of invidious use of natural law reasoning, Plessy is to race as 
Bowers v. Hardwick464 is to sexual orientation.  In that case, several justices 
invoked natural law in support of their claim that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not protect the right to engage in “homosexual sodomy.”465  Writing for 
the majority, Justice White asserted, “No connection between family, marriage, 
or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated . . . .”466  Because same-sex sexual intercourse deviates from the 
order of nature—that is, male–female vaginal intercourse that results in 
procreation—it is prohibited.  Going further, Justice White observed, 
Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.  Sodomy was a criminal 
offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen 
 
 461. Id. at 407. 
 462. DON FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS 6–7, 349–51, 360–61 (1978). 
 463. And yet, it is curious how selective Taney was.  See id. at 360 (in discussing citizenship 
of African Americans, Taney “cited three laws, ignoring others that did not suit his purpose”). 
 464. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 465. See id. 
 466. Id. at 191. 
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States when they ratified the Bill of Rights . . . .  Against this background, to 
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” is, at best, 
facetious.467 
In his superfluous concurrence, Chief Justice Burger offered much the same 
rationale: 
[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very “ancient roots.”  Decisions of 
individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state 
intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.  Condemnation of 
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical 
standards.468 
Although these arguments sound in traditional morality more than natural law 
per se, the two are inextricably linked.469 
These jurists often carved the world up into the political, civil, and 
social—a trichotomy that is often unfamiliar and frequently misunderstood by 
modern practitioners—and used these distinctions to justify certain 
outcomes.470  In the view of these jurists, laws aiming at protecting civil and 
political rights cannot be used to interfere with social relations.  The laws of 
civil society or the political community cannot intrude into the domain of the 
private.  Thus, in 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 as unconstitutional.471  The Act prohibited racial discrimination in 
public accommodation and transportation.472  The Court held that the Act, in 
reaching beyond state action to prohibit action taken by private individuals, 
exceeded the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.473  The Court fretted that 
such a law would “establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private 
 
 467. Id. at 192–94 (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
 468. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 469. See generally MARK D. JORDAN, THE INVENTION OF SODOMY IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
(1997); Andreas Roth, Crimen contra naturam, in NATURAL LAW AND LAWS OF NATURE IN 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 89, 91 (Lorraine Daston & Michael Stolleis eds., 2008) (“Deviations 
from nature are to be found most often in the case of morality offences.”); see also supra Part 1 
(discussing natural law). 
 470. See powell & Menendian, supra note 431, at 680. 
 471. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 472. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) ([A]ll persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or 
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and 
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless 
of any previous condition of servitude.”).  Although these basic protections were enshrined in the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, they were passed pursuant to Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause, not the Reconstruction Amendments. 
 473. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13. 
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rights between man and man in society.”474  In that way, the legal/social divide 
manifests onto the private/public.  The Court continued, 
In this connection, it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guarantied 
by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the 
wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of 
laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.  The wrongful act of an 
individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a 
crime of that individual . . . .475 
For the Court in Plessy, the domain of civil and political rights was wholly 
distinct from the sphere of social prejudice: 
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it 
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to 
enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of 
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.476 
Furthermore, the Court went on to state: 
The distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro 
and those requiring the separation of two races in schools, theatres, and railway 
carriages has been frequently drawn by this court.477 
Of course, we look back now and say that the Court was wrong.  But these 
distinctions persist.  In Freeman v. Pitts,478 the state action/private choice was 
inscribed deeply.  The Court said, “Where resegregation is a product not of 
state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional 
implications.”479 
More recently, in his concurrence in Parents Involved,480 Justice Thomas 
wrote: “racial imbalance [in schools] can also result from any number of 
innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices. . . .  
Individuals schools fall in and out of balance in the natural course, and the 
appropriate balance will shift with a school district’s changing 
demographics.”481  Justice Thomas, as the other Justices before him had done, 
is suggesting that there is a natural order to the world,482 and the law either 
 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. at 17. 
 476. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (emphasis added). 
 477. Id. at 546 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)). 
 478. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
 479. Id. at 498 
 480. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
 481. Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 482. Note that in doing so, Justice Thomas advances the idea of a separation between state 
and private action, a separation between state and nature.  This is based on a particular way of 
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cannot or should not disrupt that order, just as Justice Henry Billings Brown 
did in Plessy.  Instead, as Chief Justice Roberts suggests, judges are merely 
referees in a game.  Their role, in that view, is to call plays.  Justice Thomas is 
suggesting that segregation is natural or happens “outside” of the law, or that 
the law has very little direct impact on segregation.  This is something we must 
call into question.  Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in Parents Involved, 
strongly suggested that the divide between historical policies and private action 
is far from clear, and it is impossible to untangle one from the other.483 
Given these claims, one might say that the Court simply misinterpreted the 
natural position, just as Rousseau argued that Hobbes and Grotius, and 
Aristotle before them, had incorrectly assumed that men were not naturally 
equal.484  This was the essence of Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights 
Cases.  He claimed, 
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the 
fourteenth amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of 
places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the State, 
because amenable, in respect of their public duties and functions, to public 
regulation.485 
In other words, the majority was arguing that public accommodations are not 
state action, whereas Harlan was asserting that they were.  The debate is over 
what is part of the state, and what is part of nature.486  This is the wrong 
debate.  The issue is not what properly counts as natural.  The problem is the 
way we think of “natural.”  The idea of a natural position is itself problematic.  
It is the continuation of the theory of the state, where the Constitution defines 
the public, political sphere, which acts upon the “pre-political, natural order of 
 
knowing, an epistemic practice that divides the world thus, and sees individuals as already 
constituted and not through their relationship. 
 483. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 701 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The distinction between 
government and private action, furthermore, can be amorphous both as a historical matter and as a 
matter of present-day finding of fact.  Laws arise from a culture and vice versa.  Neither can 
assign to the other all responsibility for persisting injustices.”). 
 484. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 43 (Victor Gourevitch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1762) (“Caligula’s 
reasoning amounts to that of Hobbes and Grotius.  Aristotle before all of them had also said that 
men are not naturally equal, but that some were born for slavery and others for domination.”).  On 
the contrary, Rousseau believed that the natural position is freedom, that “man is born free,” but 
is “everywhere . . . in chains” on account of society.  Id. at xvii. 
 485. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 58–59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 486. Professor Tribe describes a similar debate in the Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., where the Court, although moved by “natural sympathy,” was 
“compelled by existing legal doctrine” to find no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Tribe, 
supra note 19, at 9 (quoting 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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public life.”487  The idea of a natural position needs to be much more closely 
interrogated, and our own role in terms of creating that needs to be considered. 
The umpire analogy embodies legal formalism, including its more naïve 
claims.488  The umpire analogy suggests that there are known or knowable, 
meaningful rules of law to be applied as specified by law to the facts at hand.  
In other words, judges simply apply law, but they do not create it.  
Consequently, law is largely, if not completely, determinant.  The umpire plays 
no role in creating the rules of baseball while acting as a referee.  This view 
has been staunchly refuted by legal realists, whose jurisprudential philosophy 
holds, at its extreme, that legal doctrine is “infinitely manipulable, used only to 
rationalize decisions that are actually motivated by other forces—notably by 
judges’ ‘hunches’ about how a case should be decided.”489  Critical Legal 
Studies theorists have long challenged the objectivity of law on the ground that 
its principles are indeterminate.490 
In response, Justice Scalia, for example, has acknowledged that while there 
may not always be one “correct” answer, the text of the provision at issue or 
the applicable precedent proscribes a range of possible meanings.491  
 
 487. Id. at 10. 
 488. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, 
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Enumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 166, 169 
(2006). 
 489. Williams, supra note 6, at 443.  More recently, scholars have developed a more textured 
view of so-called neutral jurists.  Moving away from the scientism located at the heart of legal 
realist claims, these scholars have developed a rejection of neutrality based not on science itself, 
but on paradigm shifts that uproot the law from its Newtonian scientific moorings.  In a 
fascinating article discussing the DeShaney case, Professor Laurence Tribe argues that the umpire 
approach to neutrality is akin to the Newtonian view of neutral space in relation to the Einsteinian 
concept of curved space.  Of the “neutral” judge, Tribe writes: 
[J]ust as space cannot extricate itself from the unfolding story of physical reality, so also 
the law cannot extract itself from social structures; it cannot “step back,” establish an 
“Archimedean” reference point of detached neutrality, and selectively reach in, as though 
from the outside, to make fine-tuned adjustments to highly particularized conflicts.  Each 
legal decision restructures the law itself, as well as the social setting in which law 
operates, because, like all human activity, the law is inevitably embroiled in the dialectical 
process whereby society is constantly recreating itself. 
Tribe, supra note 19 at 7–8. 
 490. Veillieux, supra note 131, at 1984; see Mark Tushnet, Survey Article: Critical Legal 
Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 108 (2005) (discussing the 
argument advanced by critical legal scholars that “the purely legal materials at hand (statutes, 
precedents, ‘policies,’ whatever) underdetermined results in actual cases”); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 197, 
225 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (“The indeterminacy thesis asserts that no matter how hard one tries, or 
how skilled one is as a lawyer, legal propositions in the relevant range are indeterminate.”). 
 491. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 424 (interpreting a 1989 lecture by Justice Scalia as standing 
for the proposition that “arriving at a clear and uniformly applied rule of law is often more 
important than ‘getting it right’”); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron 
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Formalism need not mean that the rules of law are mechanical, determinant, or 
that there is a “correct” answer to a legal question.492  We could be accused of 
reading more into the umpire analogy than is there, or of reading it too far, if 
we were to suggest as much.  In fact, some scholars cite these as 
misconceptions associated with legal formalism.493  However, there is some 
indication that the Chief Justice subscribes to the more mechanical view of 
law. 
In Kenny A. v. Perdue,494 a federal district judge awarded an additional 
$4.5 million in attorney’s fees for the lead attorney’s performance, which was 
described as “superb,” and “truly exceptional.”495  The award was under 
Supreme Court review, and in an exchange with the lead attorney, Chief 
Justice Roberts objected, “I don’t understand the concept of extraordinary 
success or results obtained.  The results that are obtained are presumably the 
results that are dictated or command [sic] or required under the law.”496  The 
Chief Justice said the outcome of a case “should be what the law requires, and 
not different results because you have different lawyers.”497  Could a district 
judge really suppose, he wondered, that “if it weren’t for how good you are, I 
would have made a mistake?”498 
V.  ALTERNATIVES 
As we have seen, American jurisprudence, across the spectrum of public 
and private law, remains grounded in the past—in principles and precepts of 
the Enlightenment philosophy, classical mechanics, and Newtonian physics.  
And while many of these assumptions have been radically challenged or 
outright rejected, there is a sense in which the practice, teaching, and evolution 
of law are not simply slow to adapt to these new developments—they actively 
resist them. 
 
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 370 (1994) (stating that Justice Scalia, in effect, argues that “the 
text of statutes and associated conventions of ordinary meaning generate a fairly narrow range of 
permissible outcomes”). 
 492. Id. at 174. 
 493. Id. at 170 (“Even if it turns out that the formal constraint of law is quite powerful and 
pervasive, no one who is familiar with contemporary American legal practice could reasonably 
believe that every outcome in every legal dispute is, in fact, determined by the formal constraints 
of the law.”). 
 494. 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 495. Linda Greenhouse, What the Law Demands, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Nov. 19, 2009, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/what-the-law-commands (quoting Perdue v. 
Kenny A. 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1288–89 (N.D. Ga. 2006)). 
 496. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Perdue v. Kenny A., (No. 08-970), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-970.pdf). 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. 
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Remaking law in light of the insights derived from the physical and mind 
sciences of the last century may seem daunting.499  It is all the more so given 
the incorrigibility of dominant paradigms by ‘normal science.’500  From a 
Kuhnian perspective, the Enlightenment assumptions constitute a legal 
paradigm.501  Within a paradigm, there is no way effectively to replace it.  This 
explains the failure of the critical theorists or the realists, whose critiques of 
the Enlightenment paradigm failed to transform it.502  Even today, progressives 
wonder why their constitutional arguments have failed to persuade 
conservative Justices.  The Democratic Senators who heaped scorn upon Chief 
Justice Roberts’s umpire metaphor during the Sotomayor hearings failed to 
apprehend the assumptions that have produced the judgments they take issue 
with, and they instead quibble within the dominant paradigm.503  Paradigms do 
not become accepted in linear steps, or through reason.504  Those operating 
within the paradigm work hard to protect it by reconciling anomalies and 
protecting the paradigms fundamental assumptions.  Moreover, reason is 
defined within a particular paradigm.  That is, rationality itself is paradigm-
dependent.505  Logical argumentation or persuasive reasoning cannot produce a 
paradigm shift.  Good-faith normative argument is insufficient because “we 
 
 499. 2 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 121 (1962). 
 500. Id. at 1469. 
 501. This constitutes what Steven Winter calls a “stabilized matrix.”  Winter, supra note 78, 
at 1453. 
 502. Steven Winter expounds on their failure in the present moment: 
I hazarded the claim that we are now in the throes of a full-blown crisis.  If this claim is 
right, then we should expect a paradigm shift within the next few decades.  In the context 
of this cycle of crisis-to-paradigm shift, there are two basic strategies: (1) One can try to 
implement one’s affirmative program by trying to appeal to (and/or reconstruct) a normal 
science from within; or (2) one can try to undermine an existing normal science by 
provoking or deepening crisis.  But if one chooses the latter—and there are times when 
that choice is appropriate—then one must accept the fact that one has unavoidably chosen 
marginalization.  There is, however, another alternative.  One way to appeal to a normal 
science under attack is to offer a new paradigm or radical way out of the crisis that, 
nevertheless, maintains enough of the old tradition to assuage the inevitable drive for 
homeostasis. 
Winter, supra note 78, at 1472. 
 503. “One of the frustrations with homeostatic systems of normal science is that, within their 
stabilized contexts, there is no orderly way to undo them.”  Id. at 1469. 
 504. See Kuhn, supra note 34, at 121 (“[N]ormal science ultimately leads only to the 
recognition of anomalies and crises.  And these are terminated, not by deliberation and 
interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event . . . .”); OGLE, supra note 266, at 
66 (“[T]here is no straightforward way of building up a paradigm, linearly, step-by-step, moving 
from the simple to the more complex.”). 
 505. See Kuhn, supra note 34, at 166 (“The very existence of science depends upon vesting 
the power to choose between paradigms . . . .”); see also Winter, supra note 78, at 1453 (“Kuhn’s 
influential account of the history of science identifies rationality as dependent upon such 
paradigms.”). 
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necessarily evaluate arguments and information in terms of some set of 
unconscious assumptions, beliefs, standards, frames of reference, and the 
like.”506  Rather, paradigms are replaced through Gestalt shifts, a different way 
of seeing the world, triggered after a period of crisis. 
Our purpose here is to explore the “larger cultural constructs and stabilized 
matrices” in which law is already situated, as a means of exposing the 
assumptions that animate our jurisprudence to the anomalies that have called 
them into doubt.507  In doing so, we hope to lay the groundwork for an 
alternative model of law.  Moreover, we no longer believe that these anomalies 
can be addressed within the dominant paradigm or on a piecemeal basis. 
We would not presume to be able to offer a full account of an alternative 
model of law.  However, we can suggest ways in which these insights suggest 
alternative conceptions and modes within law.  Such an exercise is not merely 
theoretical, nor do we need to start from scratch.  Existing jurisprudence offers 
models in case law and statutes for adopting what Laurence Tribe would call 
“post-Newtonian” insights.  The courts have inconsistently and sporadically 
adopted such perspectives. 
For example, in the 1969 case Gaston County v. United States,508 the 
Supreme Court held that the consideration of not only the purpose of a literacy 
requirement but also the effect on all citizens’ rights to vote amounts to an 
unconstitutional denial.509  In Gaston, a North Carolina county sought to 
reinstate a literacy test requirement for voting.510  The test had previously been 
automatically suspended after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act.511  The 
county argued, inter alia, that a literacy test did not explicitly or necessarily 
amount to race-based discrimination.512  Indeed, a uniform requirement equally 
applicable to every person wishing to vote is not explicit discrimination.513  A 
“Newtonian” view of the law would hold that a neutral test generally 
applicable would not amount to discrimination.  But the Court in Gaston 
refused to hold as much, instead declaring that the effect of the law was to 
 
 506. Winter, supra note 78, at 1496.  That does not mean that meaningful dialogue cannot 
occur.  Rather, it simply means that “transformative dialogue cannot overcome these 
incommensurables without a means for more radical conversion.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 507. Id. at 1501. 
 508. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
 509. Id. at 296–97. 
 510. Id. at 287. 
 511. Id. at 286–87. 
 512. Id. at 288. 
 513. The Court has held as much in other contexts.  See Emp. Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes)’.”). 
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deny African American citizens to vote, and that this effect was due to 
previous state action depriving African American citizens of other rights.514  
Specifically, unequal segregated education produced differential rates of 
literacy.  Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, explained: 
From this record, we cannot escape the sad truth that throughout the years 
Gaston County systematically deprived its black citizens of the educational 
opportunities it granted to its white citizens.  ‘Impartial’ administration of the 
literacy test today would serve only to perpetuate these inequities in a different 
form.515 
This decision is a far cry from the Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley.  
The Court in Milliken refused to acknowledge the role of history and influence 
of context in its ruling, just as it refused to acknowledge the broader context in 
McCleskey.516  In fact, Milliken represented a departure from the more 
contextual opinion of the district court below.  At the district level, the court 
said, “In considering the present racial complexion of the City of Detroit and 
its public school system we must first look to the past and view in perspective 
what has happened in the last half century.”517  After describing, without 
noting causation, the increase in African American population and decrease in 
white population in the city, the court continued: 
While the racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors 
may have played some part in the development of this pattern of residential 
segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and 
customs of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do 
restrict the housing opportunities of black people.  On the record there can be 
no other finding. 
  Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, 
have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning 
institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and 
to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit 
metropolitan area. . . . While it would be unfair to charge the present 
defendants with what other governmental officers or agencies have done, it can 
be said that the actions or the failure to act by the responsible school 
authorities, both city and state, were linked to that of these other governmental 
units.  When we speak of governmental action we should not view the different 
agencies as a collection of unrelated units.  Perhaps the most that can be said 
is that all of them, including the school authorities, are, in part, responsible for 
the segregated condition which exists.  And we note that just as there is an 
interaction between residential patterns and the racial composition of the 
 
 514. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291 (1969). 
 515. Id. at 296–97. 
 516. See supra notes 315–27 and accompanying text. 
 517. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
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schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the 
racial composition of the schools.518 
This lower court’s decision represents the post-Newtonian 
contextual/cross-domain views called for by Tribe, Kennedy, and others.  The 
district court recognized that there is a relationship between public actions that 
shape private behaviors, and that public actions cannot be compartmentalized 
and atomized by agencies, departments, and legislators, but are a combination 
of and emergent characteristic of all.  Similarly, the actions of private citizens 
are not so compartmentalized and are in fact related to and in part determined 
by public actions. 
Notably, individual Justices have expressed post-Newtonian insights in 
recent years, particularly late in their terms or after their time on the bench.  In 
a commencement address, Justice Souter explained that “judicial perception 
turns on the experience of the judges,”519 a view well-founded within the mind 
sciences.520  In his final opinion, Justice Stevens expressed an eloquent critique 
of the possibility of an ‘objective and neutral’ judicial outlook: 
Although Justice Scalia aspires to an “objective,” “neutral” method of 
substantive due process analysis, his actual method is nothing of the sort.  
Under the “historically focused” approach he advocates, numerous threshold 
questions arise before one ever gets to the history.  At what level of generality 
should one frame the liberty interest in question?  What does it mean for a 
right to be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’”?  By what 
standard will that proposition be tested?  Which types of sources will count, 
and how will those sources be weighed and aggregated?  There is no objective, 
neutral answer to these questions.  There is not even a theory—at least, Justice 
Scalia provides none—of how to go about answering them.521 
The task of remaking law—to render it adequate to the task of thinking and 
acting in the 21st century—cannot lie solely with the courts.  Although the 
common law and the constitutional provisions provide textual bases for such 
revision, Congress plays an important role.  With recognition of the 
intransigence of certain problems, given the complexity and depth of particular 
problems, Congress has adopted prophylactic measures that stress outcomes 
rather than process.  The Court, in its turn, has at times endorsed these 
approaches.  For example, in Kimel, the Court recognized that “[d]ifficult and 
intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never held 
that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic 
 
 518. Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 
 519. Souter, Commencement Remarks supra note 416. 
 520. See supra Part II.C (discussing the interchange between perception and prior 
experience). 
 521. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, No. 08-1521 (June 10, 2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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legislation.”522  In Garrett the Court said that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
reflected the Congressional determination “that litigation had proved 
ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-
point gap” between black and white voter registration.523  Private remedies 
were ineffective in addressing deeply entrenched public harms. 
In other contexts, with harms that are particularly pernicious and difficult 
to address, Congress has called for assessment of impact, such as 
environmental impact statements.  Similarly, in response to the inadequacies of 
the Fourteenth Amendment intent doctrine announced in Washington v. 
Davis,524 Professor Derek Black has suggested the deliberate indifference 
standard.525  The Court, according to Black, is focusing on the wrong question 
when it comes to discrimination—it asks not about the harm to the plaintiff, 
but instead about the moral culpability of the discriminatory bad actor.526  He 
posits that “whether a harm is perpetrated by malicious motivations, benign 
neglect, indifference, or pure ignorance does not change the harm.”527  
Additionally, failure to prevent the harm of discrimination or unequal 
treatment can be called a failure to provide equal protection under the law.528  
Intent, as we note above, is not as simple as the Court makes it.  For example, 
in the case of a defendant, such as the state in Davis,529 that continues to use a 
racially discriminatory test in spite of the results, knowing that African-
American plaintiffs will be harmed could have easily been called intentional 
discrimination had the Court wanted it to be.  The intent standard is 
problematic because it causes the Court to speculate on whether or not 
discrimination occurred, or whether or not the racial disparity at hand is even 
objectionable, as with disparate impact.530 
In addition, the intent standard, according to Black, preserves the already 
uneven status quo.531  Black argues that the current state of racial disparities is 
not simply the result of past discrimination or cumulative discrimination, but it 
 
 522. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000). 
 523. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001). 
 524. 426 U.S. 229, 239–45 (1976). 
 525. Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s Meaning and Its Legal 
Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 537 
(2007). 
 526. Id. at 569. 
 527. Id. 
 528. Id. at 569–70. 
 529. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1976). 
 530. Black, supra note 525, at 571.  Black posits that the ability of a judge to test whether or 
not racial disparities are aberrational is especially hard considering the privilege entrenched in 
most judges.  Id. at 571–72.  In addition, discrimination has changed since many of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rules have been put in place, but the Court is unwilling to revisit 
discrimination jurisprudence in light of these changes.  Id. at 571. 
 531. Id. at 572. 
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is “dependent on active decisions and policies.”532  The racial inequality today 
“is directly connected to yesterday’s, and it extends back to the very status quo 
that equal protection was intended to challenge.”533  The courts ignore this 
continuing discrimination by treating the harm “as neutral if [the harm] cannot 
be connected to an overt racial consideration.”534  This method of ignoring 
discrimination is apparent in the decisions of the court in de facto school 
segregation cases discussed above.535 
In response to this judicial failure to remedy discrimination according to 
the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment,536 Black suggests a deliberate 
indifference standard, which would “focus on whether the government is 
actively cognizant of its citizens’ rights and the harm it causes them . . . .”537  
His standard asks “first, whether the government was or should have been 
aware of the racial harm or impacts that its actions caused or the 
benefits/opportunities it denied; second, whether other less harmful reasonable 
alternatives were or became available . . . .”538  If the first two prongs are 
answered affirmatively, the inquiry continues with “third, why those 
alternatives were not implemented; and fourth, what, if any, interests are used 
to justify the racial harm.”539  If the government cannot provide a purpose that 
outweighs the harm of discrimination, the court must find that equal protection 
was denied. 
The alternative view of discrimination has important consequences for the 
kinds of remedial action that both Congress and plaintiffs in civil rights cases 
ought to be able to seek.  Perhaps the paradigmatic case of this nexus between 
complex causation and remedies is voting discrimination and Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).540  The VRA sought to intervene in a 
long history of African-American vote denial and dilution across the United 
States, particularly in the South.  For decades, Congress and the Court had 
attempted to blot out each novel practice of vote denial, which amounted to “a 
 
 532. Id. 
 533. Id. at 573. 
 534. Id. 
 535. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); see 
also supra Section V. 
 536. Black suggests that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to secure 
affirmative rights, not just passive rights or negative rights to be free from discrimination.  Black, 
supra note 525, at 563.  This equal protection entitles all people to the protection of the law.  Id. 
at 577.  Black’s equal protection is envisioned as an active shield against the status quo and “was 
intended to correct the defects in the political process and ensure that our republican form of 
government carries out its mandate.”  Id. 
 537. Id. at 575. 
 538. Id. 
 539. Id. 
 540. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006). 
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constitutional game of ‘Whac-A-Mole . . . ,’”541 in which each new statute or 
decision was met with a more clever form of disenfranchisement.  In response 
to this interminable game, Congress enacted Section 5 of the VRA, which, 
among other things, requires covered jurisdictions to submit for pre-approval 
(“preclear”) almost any changes in their local voting procedures with the 
Department of Justice.  Congress recognized that the phenomenon of 
disenfranchisement is a complex system with lots of moving parts.  Addressing 
each one piece by piece would fail to change the overall system.  In response, 
they created a flexible mechanism—preclearance—that could intervene within 
the system to address novel vote denial schemes as they arose. 
The source of Congress’s power to enact this sort of flexible, intervention-
based, prophylactic scheme is its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At one point in history, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Congress’s power under this provision to be almost without limit.542  But 
starting with City of Boerne v. Flores543 and continuing to this day, the Court 
has gradually chipped away at Congress’s power to enact prophylactic 
remedies.  In 2009, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 
Holder (“NAMUDNO”), the Court declined to address squarely the 
constitutionality of the VRA, instead disposing of the case narrowly.544  
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion—as well as the tenor of the questions at oral 
argument—sent a message to Congress that intrusive prophylactic schemes, 
such as preclearance, may not pass constitutional muster the next time around.  
This message from the Court should give pause to those who view the VRA’s 
preclearance procedure as precisely the kind of remedy required to meet the 
complex system of disenfranchisement that persists in portions of the United 
States today. 
If we understand law as a formative context for society, then it makes 
sense that courts account for how their decisions shape that society, not simply 
assume a safe, distant remove from society, and that the application of law 
flows from objective vantage point.  We need to account for the uneven, 
“warped” legal space, and the way in which the law differentially impacts 
people based upon their circumstances.  Similar to disparate impact standards, 
“The question is whether the state’s combination of acts and omissions, rules, 
funding decisions and the like, so shaped the legal landscape in which women 
decide matters bearing on their reproductive lives as to violate the 
Constitution’s postulates of liberty and equality.”545  This suggests a very 
 
 541. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 33, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 
No. 08–322, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 542. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651–53 (1966). 
 543. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 544. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2516–17. 
 545. Tribe, supra note 19, at 32. 
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different approach to remedies and to causation.  The law itself is a causal 
contributor to particular outcomes, and not separate or distinct from its effects.  
Some jurists will likely be uncomfortable with a systems approach because 
outcomes matter.  While this is what the deontologicalist tries to deny, there is 
a way of proceeding based on participation and probability.546 
CONCLUSION 
“The Outside Is Not, The Inside Is Too” 
 - Don Cherry547 
In his account of the Scientific Revolution, Stephen Shapin claims that 
there is a great paradox at the heart of modern science, put there in the 
seventeenth century: “the more a body of knowledge is understood to be 
objective and disinterested, the more valuable it is as a tool in moral and 
political action.”548  Through this paradox we can fully understand the utility of 
then-judge John Roberts’ umpire metaphor, with all of its trappings.  Science 
serves a legitimizing function.549  The more adjudication appears like science, 
the less it appears to be politics.  But short of performing experiments in a 
laboratory or testing theories like Einstein or Newton, how can one claim this 
prestige?  The answer is by appropriating the methodology of the Scientific 
Revolution or, failing that, its grammar.  Much of modern Western intellectual 
activity in the past 400 years has sought to mimic science.550  The 
Enlightenment Project is the essence of this mimicry, to create a “science of 
man.”  In Part II, we set out the grammar of the Enlightenment Project.  We 
described its basic assumptions and practices.  In Part III we traced how these 
assumptions and practices shaped Anglo-American law and American 
constitutional law from its inception and how those epistemic practices 
continue to be employed today.  Throughout this article we suggested that the 
law is built upon the foundations of the Enlightenment epistemology. 
The Enlightenment Project engendered a radical separation.551  It helped 
usher in the separation of the self from the world, the subject and the object, 
 
 546. See generally Susan Sturm, Activating Systemic Change Toward Full Participation: The 
Pivotal Role of Boundary Spanning Institutional Intermediaries, 54 ST. LOUIS U L.J. 1117. 
 547. DON CHERRY, UNIVERSAL MOTHER (Atlantic Recording Company 1976). 
 548. SHAPIN, supra note 25, at 164. 
 549. James Hackney claims that ever since, “modern culture has required that any enterprise 
with pretensions to stature claim to be scientific.”  HACKNEY, supra note 32, at 13. 
 550. See id. at 12–13.  One could call this “scientism.” 
 551. Some have suggested that the first hominids and proto-humans experienced a self that 
was fundamentally embedded, that man’s world and man’s self were undifferentiated in any 
meaningful way, that the external and internal worlds were fused, and that man experienced no 
existential fears.  KEN WILBER, UP FROM EDEN 26 (1996).  In a sense, the “universal myth” of 
the Garden of Eden represents humanity’s rise to consciousness, self-knowledge of the world 
triggers existential awareness, and the fears that flow from it.  But it is suggested that even pre-
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the observer and observed, society and nature, and even of Nature’s God, the 
divine clockmaker.  Consequently, the way we know the world is either by 
observing it from a distance or through Reason, a priori thought untainted by 
tradition or sensory illusions.  The Enlightenment philosophes appropriated 
this methodology in constructing a science of man. 
This separation introduced to humanity ontological fear.  Once we are 
separate from the world, a freestanding individual, we leave the “state of 
nature” and enter a state of war, a cold war fought on the proxy battlefields of 
the mind and in law.  It is a fear that instigates a search for certainty, whether it 
is Cartesian cogito or Newton’s laws.  Fear of relativism, nihilism, and other 
supposed evils—such as judicial activism—motivates a claim to objectivity in 
law, and certainty in its application.552 
But it is a war that cannot be won.  We are in a battle against time, which 
claims our lives, against others, who would take our property, and the state, 
which is ostensibly organized to protect us from each other.  The deep 
Cartesian anxiety merely precedes the Hobbesian fear of others, which 
precedes the fear of a tyrannical state.553  It’s a fear that cannot be resolved.  
But it is a fear that need not be resolved. 
In Part IV, we sketched modern developments in the physical, biological, 
and mind sciences.  What connects the modern developments in the physical 
and mind sciences are that they are all “whole” approaches.  Everything in 
quantum theory is radically holistic.  The subject and object are broken down.  
From a social science perspective, individuality—the self—emerges from 
interactions rather than as a pre-given.  Systems theory is a paradigm with a 
different philosophical lineage and a different set of assumptions about 
knowing.  The contrast is sometimes drawn between Newtonian science and 
quantum physics, with the latter having parallel assumptions about the impact 
of the observer, the dynamic, evolving nature of reality, interconnectedness, 
and the appropriate unit of analysis being relationships rather than parts.  
Compared to the classical models, modern science, both of the physical world, 
of biological and social systems, and of the mind, is radically holistic. 
 
modern man experienced an embeddedness that is only fully split asunder with the fifteenth to 
eighteen centuries.  To the ancients and other pre-moderns, at least in the West, humanity was 
deeply embedded in the cosmos.  In the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian worldview, the “self existed in 
relation to th[e] divine structure.”  SEIGEL, supra note 44, at 52. 
 552. Gedicks, supra note 70, at 642. 
 553. Indeed, one may reasonably interpret tea party anger and resentment as an expression of 
this fear.  See, for example, J.M. Bernstein, The Very Angry Tea Party (June 13, 2010), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/the-very-angry-tea-party/?src=me&ref=general 
(“Tea Party anger is, at bottom, metaphysical, not political: what has been undone by the 
economic crisis is the belief that each individual is metaphysically self-sufficient, that  one’s very 
standing and being as a rational agent owes nothing to other individuals or institutions.”). 
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This brings into view an understanding that we are deeply inter- and intra-
related with the world, that we are a part of it.  The new science brings us back 
into relationship with the world, but not in the same way as the pre-moderns.  
We are a part of the world in the sense that we are constantly engaged with it.  
There is an intra-action between the subject/object/environment.554  There is an 
evolving dynamic between us and things, but the dynamic changes the thing 
and us.  In that sense, there is no meaningful distinction between the things, 
and the relationship becomes part of a larger phenomena.  Observing affects 
the observed and the observer.  Moreover, there is a limit to certainty and to 
knowledge itself.  The self requires reconceptualization.  The self is not a 
rigidly defined construct, but is constantly in flux, shaped by environment and 
interactions, all of which are relationships. 
More profoundly, to see objects, parts of the whole, or “things” as such, 
even in relationship, is to miss the fluidity of these things.  These relationships 
are not the interaction of things, but the intrarelationship of processes.  And 
those processes are processes, and so on.  From this perspective, the world is 
far more fluid, dynamic, interactive, and insubstantial.  Because the processes 
change at different speeds, some things seem stable or set, while others seem 
more fluid, like water.  But we know that even mountains flow, just at a very 
different speed.  What this suggests is that the ontological fear produced by the 
Enlightenment is built upon the creaky epistemological edifice of the Scientific 
Revolution.  It is not just that the separation engendered by the Enlightenment 
Project is false; it is dangerously false on account of the fear that it generates. 
Self-knowledge, in the Enlightenment worldview, leads to a separation 
from the world, particularly in Western society.  But the challenge is 
acknowledging our intra-relationship to the world, our embeddedness in it.555  
The impact of this would be transformative in law, in terms of how we 
organize space, our standards for causality, and the distribution of 
responsibility.  We would recognize that law is not a neutral referee or an inert 
background; it is a participant in a dynamic, intra-active world.  In Part V, we 
suggested ways in which the law could better reflect these insights, building 
upon existing models and suggesting new ones. 
Increasingly, there is a sense, nearly one hundred years since Freud and 
Einstein, that the Enlightenment Project has run its course.  As George Soros 
notes, we have now lived with over two hundred years of the Enlightenment, 
 
 554. And there is no inert environment or background. 
 555. To follow the Eden myth as a metaphor already developed, our self-knowledge cannot 
be undone.  The fruit of the tree of knowledge has been consumed, and from there it is not 
possible to return.  The question is whether, with self-knowledge, we can account for our 
embeddeness and interrelationship, not in an unconscious way as pre-human hominids and 
animals do, but in a conscious way. 
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and its limitations are increasingly evident.556  Professor Laurence Tribe has 
long called for “post-Newtonian perspectives” in judicial adjudication.557  Not 
content simply to revise and refurbish our ways of thinking and being, linguist 
George Lakoff has called for a New Enlightenment558 that would appreciate 
and make known a twenty-first century understanding of the brain and the 
mind.559 
After all, if the scientific advances that preceded and informed the 
Enlightenment have turned out to be wrong, then the social sciences that 
constitute the Enlightenment Project are also called into question.  And if, as 
Lakoff suggests, our “institutions and practices reflect our collective self-
understanding,”560 it might follow that a New Enlightenment would serve this 
end, bringing our institutions and practices which remain tethered to the Old 
Enlightenment and the Newtonian and Cartesian worldviews that underpin it in 
line with advances physical and mind sciences.  Without question, we would 
consider it an advance if the social sciences, particularly the theory of both law 
and economics, would embrace a post-Newtonian worldview. 
But our argument is not just that new developments in the physical and 
mind sciences call into question older paradigms upon which the law is 
constructed.561  That would suggest the replacement of one scientific edifice 
with another, effectively recreating many of the same problems that have 
brought us to this point.  The idea, for example, of the natural and “social” or 
“moral” sciences presumes, first, an innate separation, and second, the idea that 
social reality, or ethics, is properly the domain of “normal” science.  
Scientism—the all-encompassing scientific methodology as a complete 
worldview—flows out of the Enlightenment.562  It is, in large measure, 
scientism that we must call into question.  The application of science in 
domains in which it does not properly apply is an attempt to acquire legitimacy 
 
 556. SOROS, supra note 95, at 13–14. 
 557. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 37. 
 558. See LAKOFF, supra note 20, at 13. 
 559. Id. at 266–68. 
 560. Id. at 271. 
 561. In his symposium remarks, Prof. Isaak Dore suggested that three propositions were at 
issue: (1) Advances in natural science influence claims to knowledge in social science.  (2) 
Advances in natural science undermine older claims in natural science.  (3) Advances in natural 
science have also similarly undermine older claims in social science.  Isaak Dore, Pragmatic 
Existentialism in a Post-Newtonian World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1040 (2010).  We want to 
be clear that it is not that the new science is more real, whatever that might mean.  It might be 
more probable, but we cannot be sure that there is an underlying reality we will ever have access 
to. 
 562. WALLERSTEIN, UNCERTAINTIES OF KNOWLEDGE supra note 80, at 13 (“Scientism is the 
claim that science is disinterested and extra-social, that its truth claims are self-sustaining without 
reference to more general philosophical assertions, and that science represents the only legitimate 
mode of knowledge.”). 
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to being “scientific.”  Additionally, all normal science is conducted within a 
particular paradigm.563  To replace one paradigm with another, an updated 
science, does not grant us access to objective truth, it simply replaces one 
paradigm with another.  Our answers are not final, they are contingent. 
Breaking free from the ontological unrest set loose by the Enlightenment 
and overcoming the Cartesian anxiety means learning to live without the idea 
of absolute knowledge, of certainty.564  This, above all, is the most problematic 
legacy of the Enlightenment Project.  The great yearning for certainty, for the 
Archimedean point, of access to ultimate truth is the chimera of the 
Enlightenment.  As Soros notes, “The Age of Reason ought to yield to the Age 
of Fallibility.”565  But rejecting a claim to ultimate truth, to certainty, does not 
entail relativism, as is so often feared.  It simply means that we need to accept 
contingency, openness, fallibility, and a different basis for objectivity.566 
  
 
 563. See Kuhn, supra note 34, at 10–11 (noting that paradigms produce the prerequisites—the 
commitment to and consensus for rules and standards—for normal science). 
 564. Bernstein, supra note 45, at 166. 
 565. SOROS, supra note 95, at 14. 
 566. Iris Marion Young says that “[m]odern thought has often conceptualized objectivity as 
achieved by transcending particularities of social position and experience, abstracting from them 
to construct a standpoint outside and above them that is general rather than particular.”  IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 113 (2000).  She criticizes this scientific pursuit 
as the pursuit for a “view from nowhere.”  Id.  In her view, this method of objectivity is not real, 
nor attainable, and in fact may be problematic.  Id.  When we seek to solve a problem, looking at 
it “objectively” does not make sense, given that the problem exists in a world that is relational, 
and subjective.  Instead, principles must be applied in those contexts.  Id.  Explicit inclusion and 
recognition of differentiated situatedness can provide both experiential and critical resources to 
bear.  Id. at 115.  This new form of “objectivity” is truly inclusive, and explicitly acknowledges 
difference, structures, and relations between people and things. 
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